The video I linked to in the last post was a fantastic demonstration of Barcelona's style. What most of you would have missed is the significance of the opening segment. Watch the opening 60 seconds of the 1974 World Cup final between the Netherlands and West Germany.
The Netherlands kick of. The ball comes back to the defence. The fullbacks are pushed up as far as possible. Under pressure from the Germans the fullbacks push back in to provide support for the centrebacks. At no point do they attempt to play the long ball. The ball goes short to the rightback who then plays it straight back. These opening passes are exactly what we might expect from Barcelona. Short, simple, good movement and with a generally aggressive layout. Possession is key.
Then something really interesting happens. At 12:34 in the video a man comes running back to provide support to the centreback, just inside the leftback.He comes right the way across and picks the ball up in the centre of the pitch. The centreback then makes a darting run forward. This is not a casual jog but a concerted effort. Even Piqué would rarely make such a bold move so early on.
The man on the ball then points right. He has received support from the rightback (again). That option is closed off and so he comes inside, having complete faith in the centreback to deal with the ball. It is already clear, less than 30 seconds into the game, that we are dealing with exceptionally competent centrebacks both technically, and in terms of movement.
How many modern sides can claim such proficiency?
The player who had initially provided support reveals himself to be number 14. This player is not a defender. He is not a midfielder. He is not a winger. He is their centre forward: Johan Cruijff.
The ball is played forward and the other centreback runs forward ball at feet. The modern game perhaps has Lucio as a parallel. Regardless, the centreback looks like a midfielder on the ball. Confident, aggressive, and with a good touch. After some good interplay down the left-hand side the ball is then played back out to Cruijff at the 13:00 mark. At this stage he is the furthest outfield player back for the Netherlands and is still in the opposition half. Let's be clear here: the centre forward is the player furthest back whilst in possession. From there his dribble is as scintillating as anything Messi has put in. He wins a penalty less than 60 seconds into the World Cup Final.
What is the point of all this?
There is nothing in football that is new today. Sacchi probably made the last great tactical innovation through his holistic approach to both attacking and defending. Since then there has been nothing new. A lot has been made of the False 9 position made famous by Messi. As this video shows, it is tame compared to Cruijff (himself the driving force behind Barcelona's philosophy) and the Netherlands. Similarly attacking fullbacks, centrebacks who are good on the ball, and versatile players are all hailed as important reasons behind successful modern teams. All these are correct. None of them are modern inventions.
Having said this, one aspect of the game is very different from the 1970s. The physical conditioning of players (though Arsenal fans may sometimes wonder) is much improved. Players are expected to lead more professional lifestyles, adhering to good diets and refraining from excesses mid-season. The effect of this is to allow heavier pressing for longer. If this had been available to the Total Football experiment of the 1970s then it might well have been more successful.
If you want to understand the direction the game is headed in, then one could do worse than consider the following: all players are exhibiting greater midfield tendencies.
Barthez, France's World Cup and European Championship winning goalkeeper, spoke of national training camps where every player - himself included - had to practice a variety of long and short passes. A level of technical proficiency was required of each player. Distribution from the 'keeper is becoming increasingly important. Long hoofs up the pitch are becoming increasingly rare, even from the floor.
As fitness improves forwards are increasingly being encouraged to press from the front. This means defenders are required to have a better first touch, greater awareness, better movement, better passing and greater composure. In short, they have to display midfield tendencies. Lucio, Piqué and David Luiz are the future. And this is just the centrebacks. The preponderance of 4-3-3 style formations mean that it is vital for fullbacks to be able to provide attacking width. I can't think of a technically competent fullback at a top club. Note that this is still not new. Both sides in the 1974 World Cup final played a 4-3-3 with technically sound fullbacks.The difference is that sides now are becoming increasingly forced to develop technically sound defenders as sides press from the front and defences are becoming harder to unlock. Previously these talents were a luxury. Now they are a necessity.
Let's be clear what this means: attackers are pressing and defenders are attacking. Every player must be able to dabble in every part of the game. Everyone must display midfield tendencies.
The effect on academies is strong. At Spurs - and this is by no means exclusive - players are only assigned a position when they are 15. Before that everyone must understand all the key elements of the game to a strong level. This reflects the demands of the modern game. Forwards must learn how to jockey and defenders must be comfortable playing one-twos. This broader understanding of the game also fosters a greater collective empathy. It also produces pros who can adapt to any given situation.
Have a look at the England U21s training:
It's a great move (see point 2 for the conditions)
So far I have referred to technical competence. By this I mean not just classic competencies such as passing, controlling, and shooting. I also mean good movement, intelligent decision making and team understanding (the social aspect). As a coach this can be done simply by imposing conditions on games. Here are two quick examples.
1) Set up a 3 v 3 (with or without additional goalkeepers). Each side can only have a maximum of 2 players in a half at a time. This ensures that players understand that if one player goes, another must stay. They also have to decide whether to track runs of the opposition or create controlled overloads. This involves decision making and good communication.
2) More simply, impose two touch. Players must then focus on their first touch and where they play it with their second. It also encourages players to think about where their teammates are constantly as if they start looking when they receive the ball they will almost certainly lose it. The space of the pitch and the number of touches players have can be modified to make it harder or easier, as appropriate.
The focus on positions from a young age is destructive to the development of our young players. This mindset must be trained out of both players and coaches at all levels if England are to compete at the highest level. Every player needs to have midfield tendencies. The seeds are there. They must be allowed to grow.
Sunday 4 September 2011
Saturday 3 September 2011
A nice video
Credit must go to this fantastic German language site for bringing the video below to my attention. It is an analysis of how Barcelona play. It stood out because of its technical content. No journalist I have read will provide such a good rendition of how they play. The person who uploaded it is almost certainly a coach. Enjoy!
Stay tuned this weekend for comment on "Midfield Tendencies" covering everything from attacking fullbacks, to the false 9, from total football to the present Barcelona side.
Monday 20 June 2011
How to Beat Barcelona - diagrams
To add to yesterday's post, here is a diagram explaining the basic shape and movements visually.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting a cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributes required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Furthermore both are comfortable ball at feet and so will have the necessary composure in pressured situations. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting a cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributes required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Furthermore both are comfortable ball at feet and so will have the necessary composure in pressured situations. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
How to Beat Barcelona - diagrams
To add to yesterday's post, here is a diagram explaining the basic shape and movements visually.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting a cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributes required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting a cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributes required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
How to Beat Barcelona - diagrams
To add to yesterday's post, here is a diagram explaining the basic shape and movements visually.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributed required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributed required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
Sunday 19 June 2011
How to Beat Barcelona - Case Study v Inter
My last post was somewhat vague. This post centres on Barcelona's biggest loss of the past two years. Not the biggest by margin - Hercules beat them 2-0 at the Nou Camp in the second game of this season just past - but also by occasion, a Champions League semi-final no less. Now before I begin, many will recall the volcano which disrupted their preparations, forcing them to travel by coach. An entirely valid point but worth tempering by the realisation that they were not on a school trip to Dover. Money could not buy a more comfortable coach. It was also true that Barcelona were missing Iniesta. Similarly valid, but it seems to be as much a criticism as an excuse to blame a two goal defeat on the absence of one player.
It's worth noting that Sky got the Inter tactics horribly wrong there. It is truly embarrassing that they hadn't had a researcher watch a single Inter game that season before a Champions League Semi-final. Inter played a 4-2-3-1 as they did for most of the 2009/2010 season, with Pandev on the left wing, Eto'o on the right and Milito alone upfront. This point will become extremely important later.
A quick refresher. Ibrahimovic played upfront for Barcelona. This suited Lucio and Samuel who adore a scrap. Watch Lucio's masterclass against Drogba earlier on in the competition, here. Messi played off him. Nominally he started on the right wing and cut inside but in actual fact he drifted across the width of the pitch. He did not play as the central forward he does now. That has changed. The similarity is perhaps in Messi's willingness to drop deep to collect the ball.
Before the game Mourinho said this:
This was true. However Inter's formation was perfectly designed to cope with Barcelona then, particularly Messi. Take a look at this video of Messi's touches during the game. Note the following:
1) Cambiassso and Thiago Motta provided a tight screen between Messi and the goal. This made a pass the more attractive option a lot of the time. see: 36 seconds on the video.
2) When Messi was able to isolate one of them - usually Cambiasso when Motta had got forward - the holding player would not dive in but instead stand off him, looking to hold Messi up. Motta would always be back quickly to hussle. see: 55 seconds.
3) Cesar made some terrific stops, particularly from the freekick. see: 3:35.
4) Sneijder and sometimes even Eto'o would help out if Messi dropped deep. see: 1:45.
The temptation could be for Cambiasso and Motta to come out to pressure Messi when he gets closer to his backline but this makes the side less compact. As Mourinho said after the 2nd leg, Inter never wanted to surrender their position. Moving the defensive shield forward leaves a gap in front of the defenders to exploit.
This point is really brought into relief when you consider the dishevelled defending Inter displayed at home to Barcelona earlier in the season. Watch it here. When Messi has the ball he is confronted by a scattered defence. Zanetti and Motta performed the holding roles and it failed to work. Zanetti in particular was torn apart.
The difference? Compactness and positional discipline. The embodiment of this was Cambiasso. He rightly drew a lot of praise for his semi-final performances. Here is his 1st leg contribution:
Without the ball he does three things superbly. Firstly, he is extremely disciplined in shielding the defence. Motta is given free reign to move forward. Cambiasso is expected to keep his position more strictly. Secondly, his tackling was first class. Thirdly, he knew when to dive in and when to stand off. When faced with Messi he would back off forcing Messi to take the initiative. Other times he harried players on their first touch, not giving them a single metre. This puts pressure on less technically gifted players and is psychologically tough when you know that everytime you get the ball s fierce Argentine with no hair is going to bully you.
With the ball he is also interesting. He consistently targeted the position between centreback and fullback with quick balls. See 20 seconds, 39 seconds, 1 minute, 1 minute 30 seconds... among others. He rarely took the time to think about these. The reliance was on pace. This brings into play another interesting feature of Inter's game plan...
Those pesky wide players: Pandev and Eto'o. When Cambiasso had the ball he played quick balls into the space left by the advancing Brazilian fullbacks, Alves and Maxwell. By playing these balls quickly they ensured the Barcelona fullbacks didn't have time to recover. To take full advantage, Pandev and Eto'o would have been told to be extremely sharp during the transition periods. The transition against Barcelona is key because they press the ball so aggressively. In order to transition effectively against a side like Barcelona you have to identify a simple way of doing so that all involved parties will be able to execute. Exploiting that gap at fullback with players like Pandev and Eto'o seems perfect. In fact the standard model was to have Sneijder and Pandev overload the left, and Maicon and Eto'o overload the right. This left Milito free to hold more central positions and for inter to attack quickly with just 5 players.
Indeed if defensively Inter's victory can be attributed to their vertical compactness, offensively it was their lateral control which won them the match. Not only did they try to effect quick switches but all four forward players looked to exploit the space left at fullback, through quick transition play. All 3 goals came this way. Check them here from 42 seconds.
Goal 1: A quick switch by Sneijder to Eto'o seeks to exploit space down the right. Eto'o has time to chest the ball down comfortably. Milito eventually gets the ball in the middle who knocks it to Sneijder who holds his position wonderfully to score on the far side. Terrible defending by Alves but the initial overload on the right handside with Eto'o and Maicon caused panic in the Barcelona defence.
Goal 2: Sneijder surges forward with the ball. He plays a ball into Milito's diagonal run cutting out Maxwell (whose interception fails). Classic ball into that area. Yet again Maicon's appearance creates the overload, and he scores with a cool finish.
Goal 3: Maicon again forward and again not trying to be the widest player, but moving inside. Play breaks down but it is a quick ball to Eto'o who is AGAIN in space which leads to the cross from which the goal is scored.
It is clear from this that Sneijder's passing was instrumental to the first two goals. He inadvertantly set up the third. The forward's width - particularly Eto'o - resulted in all three goals. And Maicon's runs inside to give Eto'o space out wide was key in two goals and may have played a part in the third.
Deep breaths.
Inter were compact in defence. Cambiasso and Motta were key in protecting the back four, taking the pressure off Lucio and Samuel. Inter always had a spare man or two at the back because of this. Furthermore their transitions were quick, looking to exploit both space at fullback and lateral space left by intense pressing. They created an overload on Barcelona's weaker left side.
How much of this is relevant to beating Barcelona today?
Well there is no more Ibrahimovic. Messi has a more fluid role in the term, ostensibly playing as the central forward. Messi loves to drop deep and when he does there is confusion as to who should be tracking him. Playing a shield with players like Motta and Cambiasso could be key to following his runs. They should be extremely disciplined and remain close to the central defenders.
Barcelona have a greater threat on the wings now with Villa. This takes the pressure off the leftback to come forward. In big games this season Barcelona have often played Puyol there, knowing that the overlap isn't so important down the left side. However it is still true that Alves leaves space down the right to be exploited. Winning the ball on the right of midfield and playing quick balls into that space with a left winger or centre forward eager to pick up on it, perhaps with the support of a marauding leftback could be key. Alves may well be strong going forward, and his defensive frailties are often overstated, but it remains true that whilst he holds a position high up the pitch there is space in behind to be exploited.
Finally every single player must be willing to work hard an exert pressure on the ball. Sneijder helped out in the middle, Eto'o and Pandev worked incredibly hard on the wings, and Milito ran so hard he suffered from cramp. Prima donnas are not a luxury you can afford against Barcelona. This point was emphasised when Balotelli was brought on for Milito late on. Watch his exceptionally daft cameo performance here.
Players must be quick on the ball and exceptionally committed off it. As Mourinho said, the game is played 11 v 11. A simple, sobering truth.
Edit: As an aside, it was notable how often Alex Ferguson was telling his players to play wide - Rooney in particular - during the Champions League final. Where they failed, according to my above analysis, is both in protecting the back four and in transitioning quickly enough.
It's worth noting that Sky got the Inter tactics horribly wrong there. It is truly embarrassing that they hadn't had a researcher watch a single Inter game that season before a Champions League Semi-final. Inter played a 4-2-3-1 as they did for most of the 2009/2010 season, with Pandev on the left wing, Eto'o on the right and Milito alone upfront. This point will become extremely important later.
A quick refresher. Ibrahimovic played upfront for Barcelona. This suited Lucio and Samuel who adore a scrap. Watch Lucio's masterclass against Drogba earlier on in the competition, here. Messi played off him. Nominally he started on the right wing and cut inside but in actual fact he drifted across the width of the pitch. He did not play as the central forward he does now. That has changed. The similarity is perhaps in Messi's willingness to drop deep to collect the ball.
Before the game Mourinho said this:
Messi is the number one danger. He is an important player who needs major attention but, according to my culture, man-marking is impossible. It will not be one of ours against Messi and 10 against 10 others, but 11 against 11.
This was true. However Inter's formation was perfectly designed to cope with Barcelona then, particularly Messi. Take a look at this video of Messi's touches during the game. Note the following:
1) Cambiassso and Thiago Motta provided a tight screen between Messi and the goal. This made a pass the more attractive option a lot of the time. see: 36 seconds on the video.
2) When Messi was able to isolate one of them - usually Cambiasso when Motta had got forward - the holding player would not dive in but instead stand off him, looking to hold Messi up. Motta would always be back quickly to hussle. see: 55 seconds.
3) Cesar made some terrific stops, particularly from the freekick. see: 3:35.
4) Sneijder and sometimes even Eto'o would help out if Messi dropped deep. see: 1:45.
The temptation could be for Cambiasso and Motta to come out to pressure Messi when he gets closer to his backline but this makes the side less compact. As Mourinho said after the 2nd leg, Inter never wanted to surrender their position. Moving the defensive shield forward leaves a gap in front of the defenders to exploit.
This point is really brought into relief when you consider the dishevelled defending Inter displayed at home to Barcelona earlier in the season. Watch it here. When Messi has the ball he is confronted by a scattered defence. Zanetti and Motta performed the holding roles and it failed to work. Zanetti in particular was torn apart.
The difference? Compactness and positional discipline. The embodiment of this was Cambiasso. He rightly drew a lot of praise for his semi-final performances. Here is his 1st leg contribution:
Without the ball he does three things superbly. Firstly, he is extremely disciplined in shielding the defence. Motta is given free reign to move forward. Cambiasso is expected to keep his position more strictly. Secondly, his tackling was first class. Thirdly, he knew when to dive in and when to stand off. When faced with Messi he would back off forcing Messi to take the initiative. Other times he harried players on their first touch, not giving them a single metre. This puts pressure on less technically gifted players and is psychologically tough when you know that everytime you get the ball s fierce Argentine with no hair is going to bully you.
With the ball he is also interesting. He consistently targeted the position between centreback and fullback with quick balls. See 20 seconds, 39 seconds, 1 minute, 1 minute 30 seconds... among others. He rarely took the time to think about these. The reliance was on pace. This brings into play another interesting feature of Inter's game plan...
Those pesky wide players: Pandev and Eto'o. When Cambiasso had the ball he played quick balls into the space left by the advancing Brazilian fullbacks, Alves and Maxwell. By playing these balls quickly they ensured the Barcelona fullbacks didn't have time to recover. To take full advantage, Pandev and Eto'o would have been told to be extremely sharp during the transition periods. The transition against Barcelona is key because they press the ball so aggressively. In order to transition effectively against a side like Barcelona you have to identify a simple way of doing so that all involved parties will be able to execute. Exploiting that gap at fullback with players like Pandev and Eto'o seems perfect. In fact the standard model was to have Sneijder and Pandev overload the left, and Maicon and Eto'o overload the right. This left Milito free to hold more central positions and for inter to attack quickly with just 5 players.
Indeed if defensively Inter's victory can be attributed to their vertical compactness, offensively it was their lateral control which won them the match. Not only did they try to effect quick switches but all four forward players looked to exploit the space left at fullback, through quick transition play. All 3 goals came this way. Check them here from 42 seconds.
Goal 1: A quick switch by Sneijder to Eto'o seeks to exploit space down the right. Eto'o has time to chest the ball down comfortably. Milito eventually gets the ball in the middle who knocks it to Sneijder who holds his position wonderfully to score on the far side. Terrible defending by Alves but the initial overload on the right handside with Eto'o and Maicon caused panic in the Barcelona defence.
Goal 2: Sneijder surges forward with the ball. He plays a ball into Milito's diagonal run cutting out Maxwell (whose interception fails). Classic ball into that area. Yet again Maicon's appearance creates the overload, and he scores with a cool finish.
Goal 3: Maicon again forward and again not trying to be the widest player, but moving inside. Play breaks down but it is a quick ball to Eto'o who is AGAIN in space which leads to the cross from which the goal is scored.
It is clear from this that Sneijder's passing was instrumental to the first two goals. He inadvertantly set up the third. The forward's width - particularly Eto'o - resulted in all three goals. And Maicon's runs inside to give Eto'o space out wide was key in two goals and may have played a part in the third.
Deep breaths.
Inter were compact in defence. Cambiasso and Motta were key in protecting the back four, taking the pressure off Lucio and Samuel. Inter always had a spare man or two at the back because of this. Furthermore their transitions were quick, looking to exploit both space at fullback and lateral space left by intense pressing. They created an overload on Barcelona's weaker left side.
How much of this is relevant to beating Barcelona today?
Well there is no more Ibrahimovic. Messi has a more fluid role in the term, ostensibly playing as the central forward. Messi loves to drop deep and when he does there is confusion as to who should be tracking him. Playing a shield with players like Motta and Cambiasso could be key to following his runs. They should be extremely disciplined and remain close to the central defenders.
Barcelona have a greater threat on the wings now with Villa. This takes the pressure off the leftback to come forward. In big games this season Barcelona have often played Puyol there, knowing that the overlap isn't so important down the left side. However it is still true that Alves leaves space down the right to be exploited. Winning the ball on the right of midfield and playing quick balls into that space with a left winger or centre forward eager to pick up on it, perhaps with the support of a marauding leftback could be key. Alves may well be strong going forward, and his defensive frailties are often overstated, but it remains true that whilst he holds a position high up the pitch there is space in behind to be exploited.
Finally every single player must be willing to work hard an exert pressure on the ball. Sneijder helped out in the middle, Eto'o and Pandev worked incredibly hard on the wings, and Milito ran so hard he suffered from cramp. Prima donnas are not a luxury you can afford against Barcelona. This point was emphasised when Balotelli was brought on for Milito late on. Watch his exceptionally daft cameo performance here.
Players must be quick on the ball and exceptionally committed off it. As Mourinho said, the game is played 11 v 11. A simple, sobering truth.
Edit: As an aside, it was notable how often Alex Ferguson was telling his players to play wide - Rooney in particular - during the Champions League final. Where they failed, according to my above analysis, is both in protecting the back four and in transitioning quickly enough.
Sunday 12 June 2011
How to Beat Barcelona
Watching the Champions League final I was goaded into offering my "professional" opinion on how to beat Barcelona. At the time I declined to comment. Mourinho, Ferguson and Wenger have all been beaten by two goals or more this season. It would be odd, I thought, to profess greater insight than these illustrious names. Nonetheless, for some odd reason, I find myself compelled to offer a few solutions.
1 - Muzzle Busquets
Makalele's holding role was one of the most talked about tactical developments in the last decade. His role off the ball garnered far more attention than his role in recycling possession. Once he had a man marker, he was far less effective.
Busquets role - aside from theatrically throwing himself to the floor - is to recycle possession. This means to play simple passes to keep possession rather than risk it. They only risk possession higher up the field when Xavi and Iniesta have it. What Busquets does very well is provide stability in front of the back four. Barcelona never lose possession in that dangerous area in front of the back four because Busquets is such a talented passer. When Mascherano - an inferior passer, if perhaps a better tackler - was played in that role before Christmas, Barcelona looked a lot poorer. Xavi is a big fan of Busquets, saying:
A surprising element of the Champions League Final was the amount of space Busquets frequently had. Rooney was the obvious candidate to muzzle him with suitable aggression and technical proficiency, but instead concentrated on assuming wide positions to exploit space at fullback.
A lot is said of Messi but I feel that preventing the ball from reaching him (by way of Xavi and Iniesta) is key. Prevention not cure. Muzzling Busquets could be key. This will mean the centrebacks have to spend more time on the ball. Whilst they are accomplished for centrebacks they remain the weakest outfield players on the ball. Messi may well feel compelled to come even deeper to claim the ball, and the further away from your goal Messi is, the better.
As an aside, Mourinho's tactic in the Champions League Semi-Final first leg might well have worked, had they had a player like Tevez rather than Ronaldo playing. Ronaldo's unwillingness to press makes him a luxury player at times. A player like Tevez - who has now publicly stated his unwillingness to return to Manchester - might be the perfect solution for Mourinho.
In general hard working forwards are needed to contain Barcelona's fullbacks and press from the front. Inter's 3-1 victory at home to Barcelona last season is partly testament to this.
2 - Control the momentum of the match
Momentum is fantastically important in football. A team losing 3-2 will feel very differently if they surrendered a 2-0 lead than if they have pulled two goals back in quick succession.
Barcelona do a fantastic job of controlling momentum through keeping possession. Their abundance of sideways passes which accounts for a good proportion of their ridiculously high possession statistics are not valuable in terms of match-winning merit - although some football purists certainly see it that way - but in the asphyxiating effect they have on the game. Whilst they have the ball the momentum of the game is in their hands. The other team are playing in reaction to them. Psychologically this is extremely important.
Notably when things aren't going their way they are more than happy to play dirty. Diving, hounding the referee, winding up opponents... you name it, they will do it. Whatever it takes to unnerve the opposition.
Whilst you are unlikely to be able to outpass Barcelona, disrupting their rhythm - as Real Madrid sometimes managed this season - could be key to defeating them.
An extension of this is to be mentally resilient. When you don't have the ball it is important to remain disciplined, composed, concentrated and be willing to contest every ball. A game against Barcelona will be won in the head as much as on the field.
Make the most of set-pieces
Manchester United didn't have a single corner against Barcelona in the Champions League final. When their side is so short it seems to me to be a missed opportunity. Excellently taken free kicks and corners into the penalty area are surely a good way to beat Barcelona.
Switching Play
When Barcelona lose the ball they hound the opposition very quickly in an attempt to win it back. When Inter beat Barcelona 3-1 at the San Siro, they focused on playing a lot of switches from one side of the pitch to the other. If Barcelona press aggressively it means they have fewer players elsewhere. Players like Sneijder and Xabi Alonso, combined with some positive forward play could be enough to expose Barcelona, particularly when their fullbacks hold such high positions on the field.
So, to summarise...
Pressing, fighting, crossing and switching.
Whilst this is a far from comprehensive VOILA post, it could provide some keys to beating Barcelona. The key is in playing to win and remaining compact.
It is symptomatic of the failure to beat Barcelona that sides talk predominantly about how to stop Barcelona (Xavi, Messi et al) rather than on exposing their weaknesses. A reactive strategy is not enough to beat Barcelona. The best performances have involved a strong proactive element (e.g. Arsenal at Home, and Real Madrid in the Coppa del Rey). The successful side will take the initiative.
1 - Muzzle Busquets
Makalele's holding role was one of the most talked about tactical developments in the last decade. His role off the ball garnered far more attention than his role in recycling possession. Once he had a man marker, he was far less effective.
Busquets role - aside from theatrically throwing himself to the floor - is to recycle possession. This means to play simple passes to keep possession rather than risk it. They only risk possession higher up the field when Xavi and Iniesta have it. What Busquets does very well is provide stability in front of the back four. Barcelona never lose possession in that dangerous area in front of the back four because Busquets is such a talented passer. When Mascherano - an inferior passer, if perhaps a better tackler - was played in that role before Christmas, Barcelona looked a lot poorer. Xavi is a big fan of Busquets, saying:
"He is a soccer player who sees everything very fast. He has an excellent first touch and great balance."
A surprising element of the Champions League Final was the amount of space Busquets frequently had. Rooney was the obvious candidate to muzzle him with suitable aggression and technical proficiency, but instead concentrated on assuming wide positions to exploit space at fullback.
A lot is said of Messi but I feel that preventing the ball from reaching him (by way of Xavi and Iniesta) is key. Prevention not cure. Muzzling Busquets could be key. This will mean the centrebacks have to spend more time on the ball. Whilst they are accomplished for centrebacks they remain the weakest outfield players on the ball. Messi may well feel compelled to come even deeper to claim the ball, and the further away from your goal Messi is, the better.
As an aside, Mourinho's tactic in the Champions League Semi-Final first leg might well have worked, had they had a player like Tevez rather than Ronaldo playing. Ronaldo's unwillingness to press makes him a luxury player at times. A player like Tevez - who has now publicly stated his unwillingness to return to Manchester - might be the perfect solution for Mourinho.
In general hard working forwards are needed to contain Barcelona's fullbacks and press from the front. Inter's 3-1 victory at home to Barcelona last season is partly testament to this.
2 - Control the momentum of the match
Momentum is fantastically important in football. A team losing 3-2 will feel very differently if they surrendered a 2-0 lead than if they have pulled two goals back in quick succession.
Barcelona do a fantastic job of controlling momentum through keeping possession. Their abundance of sideways passes which accounts for a good proportion of their ridiculously high possession statistics are not valuable in terms of match-winning merit - although some football purists certainly see it that way - but in the asphyxiating effect they have on the game. Whilst they have the ball the momentum of the game is in their hands. The other team are playing in reaction to them. Psychologically this is extremely important.
Notably when things aren't going their way they are more than happy to play dirty. Diving, hounding the referee, winding up opponents... you name it, they will do it. Whatever it takes to unnerve the opposition.
Whilst you are unlikely to be able to outpass Barcelona, disrupting their rhythm - as Real Madrid sometimes managed this season - could be key to defeating them.
An extension of this is to be mentally resilient. When you don't have the ball it is important to remain disciplined, composed, concentrated and be willing to contest every ball. A game against Barcelona will be won in the head as much as on the field.
Make the most of set-pieces
Manchester United didn't have a single corner against Barcelona in the Champions League final. When their side is so short it seems to me to be a missed opportunity. Excellently taken free kicks and corners into the penalty area are surely a good way to beat Barcelona.
Switching Play
When Barcelona lose the ball they hound the opposition very quickly in an attempt to win it back. When Inter beat Barcelona 3-1 at the San Siro, they focused on playing a lot of switches from one side of the pitch to the other. If Barcelona press aggressively it means they have fewer players elsewhere. Players like Sneijder and Xabi Alonso, combined with some positive forward play could be enough to expose Barcelona, particularly when their fullbacks hold such high positions on the field.
So, to summarise...
Pressing, fighting, crossing and switching.
Whilst this is a far from comprehensive VOILA post, it could provide some keys to beating Barcelona. The key is in playing to win and remaining compact.
It is symptomatic of the failure to beat Barcelona that sides talk predominantly about how to stop Barcelona (Xavi, Messi et al) rather than on exposing their weaknesses. A reactive strategy is not enough to beat Barcelona. The best performances have involved a strong proactive element (e.g. Arsenal at Home, and Real Madrid in the Coppa del Rey). The successful side will take the initiative.
Wednesday 6 April 2011
Inter v Schalke Decompacted
Inter Milan v Schalke 04 by DeezRed77
At 2-1 the big chances had fallen Inter's way. They were ostensibly looking good. Their lack of compactness - a crime at this stage of the Champions League - proved their undoing.
Inter have just won the ball back. Then we have a ball that both Cambiasso and Sneijder tried to play frequently (with some success) all night: a diagonal ball to a forward. This time the forward is...Thiago Motta.
Look how close Sneijder, Cambiasso and Zanetti are. You'd think they were U10s who struggle to play a longer pass. The support play here is poor. There is no adequate transition from defence to attack. The strategy appear to be to spray balls in to the forward.
However, even with good passers, a long pass is risky business. The ball is miscontrolled and the defender takes the ball passing it forward. Notice now how they have 3 players around the ball (as Inter had). However they have a lot more space in which to advance. This time Inter's problem is the transition from attack to defence. 3 of Inter's midfielders were within 10 m of the lefthand touchline and so have a mission to resume central positions (the fourth, Thiago Motta, has bombed forward despite having lost it). The result of this is that having won the ball Schalke can travel 20m up the pitch without facing so much as a sniff of a challenge. There is no threat to the ball and their attack builds momentum IMMEDIATELY. There is no pause to consider which intricate pass to play, no problem solving required. Head up - GO!
As we can see here the two Inter players closest to the ball (Stankovic and Sneijder) will be easily split by a pass.
Schalke now have pace and momentum in their favour as they have a retreating defence to beat. It took 15 seconds from the moment the pass in the first frame was made to the ball being in the back of the net.
Inter's lack of compactness and positional awareness in midfield are compounded because they lack pace. Cambiasso, Stankovic, Thiago Motta and Sneijder are terrific players who are all worthy of being European Champions but none of them have much pace. To allow three of those midfielders to exhibit such a small area of the pitch is asking for trouble when playing risky balls forward to a defensive midfielder (as they did to Motta). This problem is compounded when you consider that the defence is also very slow. Zanetti is 37 and Chivu and Rannocchia are both SLOW. By not playing compactly you invite pressure onto the defence and they are made to do the one thing they least want to do: backtrack at pace. Introduce a player like Jefferson Farfan into the equation and you are asking for trouble.
This problem is not new. Benitez tried to play a high line earlier in the season and was consistently taken apart by teams who were pacey (Bale's annihilation of Inter's fastest defender Maicon stands out). You can only play a high line if you are EXTREMELY aggressive in midfield and win the ball back quickly denying the opposition midfield time and space on the ball to pick out those long passes behind the defence.
This problem is particularly frustrating because it was the principle problem during the Milan derby.
Everything Mourinho's side was - deep, aggressive, disciplined, compact, excellent at transitions - this side is not. Mourinho's side wouldn't have conceded such a sloppy goal at a corner. They wouldn't have left such big spaces after they lost the ball. Excellent players would have seemed like the best in the world (Cambiasso, Sneijder, Milito..).
Schalke themselves were poor leaving far too many spaces for Inter's static midfield and forward line but they were not Treble winners last year.
Oh how the mighty fall.
Tuesday 5 April 2011
Team Philosophy - Team like a Spring
I have found an analogy for how I believe a team should play. It is simple and effective but not intended to be holistic. It is simply this: a team should play like a spring.
When territorial pressure is applied to the side, players - like the springs of a coil - should get closer together, winding ever more tightly. The more pressure that is applied on the side, the closer they should get and the harder they should work for each other. If under mental stress it is similarly important that the side binds together in these moments rather than fracturing. The more you push a spring the more resistance you encounter. Once that pressure is released it springs back. The greater the force applied to it, the harder and faster it bounces back. A football team should also bounce back quickly on the counter attack if put under a lot of pressure.
This is the basic idea. I shall now explain in more detail.
Without the ball it is vital to be compact. The closer to goal the opposition get, the more important it is to remain compact and deny space. The person on the ball must be denied time on the ball and the space closed so that good movement is less effective. The opposition must be made to risk possession. This must be done as a TEAM. In order to remain truly compact the whole team must be in the smallest area of the pitch possible whilst maintaining good depth.
Positioning must also facilitate transitions into the attacking phase. Like a spring, the more pressure that is exerted on the team the quicker this transition must be. This is because a team that has committed more men forwards has left more space in defence. It is this space that the transition must look to exploit quickly. However, if possession has been regained inside the opposition half there are likely to be fewer spaces to exploit. Here it is not so opportune to strike quickly but instead to keep possession.
When attacking the most important attribute is SUPPORT PLAY. How well do those players off the ball support the player with the ball? A team that can provide good options will attack effectively. On the counter attack this is particularly important, but in any event the aim is to exploit any space left by the opposition QUICKLY.
The most important attribute of the attacking team is to be PROACTIVE or, more simply, PLAY TO WIN. Don't play not to lose. Play to win. Take risks, try to be play that killer ball. Make the defence uncertain and nervous.
The other team should spend far more time wondering how to counteract you, than the other way around.
Play to win.
Finally I think formations are already far less important than systems of play and it is easy to imagine a time when formations become obsolete as a way of describing tactics. Teams increasingly must attack and defend together. Spalletti's Roma played a 4-6-0 and this will prove to be the way teams play in the future. Versatile players like Messi, Ronaldo, Rooney, Nasri, Alves, Lucio, and even Wilshere are very much the future of the game. Players must be capable of playing between the lines, as comfortable with the ball at feet as they are defending, as comfortable passing as they are making surging runs forward.
Football is at an exciting moment in its development. The birth of new, more fluid ideas (I have previously referenced the "formlessness" discussed in the Art of Way) mean that tactics are very much enjoying a rebirth: their very own spring.
When territorial pressure is applied to the side, players - like the springs of a coil - should get closer together, winding ever more tightly. The more pressure that is applied on the side, the closer they should get and the harder they should work for each other. If under mental stress it is similarly important that the side binds together in these moments rather than fracturing. The more you push a spring the more resistance you encounter. Once that pressure is released it springs back. The greater the force applied to it, the harder and faster it bounces back. A football team should also bounce back quickly on the counter attack if put under a lot of pressure.
This is the basic idea. I shall now explain in more detail.
Without the ball it is vital to be compact. The closer to goal the opposition get, the more important it is to remain compact and deny space. The person on the ball must be denied time on the ball and the space closed so that good movement is less effective. The opposition must be made to risk possession. This must be done as a TEAM. In order to remain truly compact the whole team must be in the smallest area of the pitch possible whilst maintaining good depth.
Positioning must also facilitate transitions into the attacking phase. Like a spring, the more pressure that is exerted on the team the quicker this transition must be. This is because a team that has committed more men forwards has left more space in defence. It is this space that the transition must look to exploit quickly. However, if possession has been regained inside the opposition half there are likely to be fewer spaces to exploit. Here it is not so opportune to strike quickly but instead to keep possession.
When attacking the most important attribute is SUPPORT PLAY. How well do those players off the ball support the player with the ball? A team that can provide good options will attack effectively. On the counter attack this is particularly important, but in any event the aim is to exploit any space left by the opposition QUICKLY.
The most important attribute of the attacking team is to be PROACTIVE or, more simply, PLAY TO WIN. Don't play not to lose. Play to win. Take risks, try to be play that killer ball. Make the defence uncertain and nervous.
The other team should spend far more time wondering how to counteract you, than the other way around.
Play to win.
Finally I think formations are already far less important than systems of play and it is easy to imagine a time when formations become obsolete as a way of describing tactics. Teams increasingly must attack and defend together. Spalletti's Roma played a 4-6-0 and this will prove to be the way teams play in the future. Versatile players like Messi, Ronaldo, Rooney, Nasri, Alves, Lucio, and even Wilshere are very much the future of the game. Players must be capable of playing between the lines, as comfortable with the ball at feet as they are defending, as comfortable passing as they are making surging runs forward.
Football is at an exciting moment in its development. The birth of new, more fluid ideas (I have previously referenced the "formlessness" discussed in the Art of Way) mean that tactics are very much enjoying a rebirth: their very own spring.
Sunday 3 April 2011
On Milan v Inter
In the face of criticism of the players used, I dont think anyone’s mentioned that the personnel was very similar to that used by Mourinho in the CL final last year. 4 defenders, 2 holding players and Sneijder, Eto’o, Pandev, Milito/Pazzini. The problem was not inflexibility in that regard because Mourinho’s players played very differently from Leonardo’s.
The real point hasn’t quite been hit yet although the point about the midfield superiority comes closest. Milan were very COMPACT without the ball, Inter weren’t. Mourinho’s Inter’s outstanding feature was its compactness. No spaces were left for the opposition and even when out of possession they looked like a team in control. Everyone speaks of the Barcelona Semi Final and how compact Inter were then but it’s true of every game, it just stands out then because they made no attempt to attack.
When Inter had the ball you could count 7 or 8 Milan players in 1/4 of the pitch. When Milan had the ball – exacerbated by the way Pandev, Eto’o and Pazzini were deployed – Inter had that number in half the pitch. Milan were about twice as compact. This meant when Inter had the ball they had very little space and if they found some there were two players immediately on the player. The sight of Sneijder diving before taking out his frustration on the pitch in the first half is symptomatic of the difference between the two sides.
Conversely, when Milan had the ball they had a lot more time and space to pick a pass. They exploited this well, playing ball after ball behind the helpless defence. Inter’s lack of compactness also helped Milan keep the ball for long periods of the second half. When Inter did win the ball there was a big gap between defence and attack and so launching a counter attack was difficult.
Remaining compact is vital in the modern game. In fact it came out recently. I’m gonna find a quote….
Capello:
“Plan A is 9-1. This is the new football. The new system is to go forward with a lot of players and to defend with nine. You have to be compact. Barcelona and Arsenal do it. If you want to win back the ball, you have to defend with a lot of players and attack the same.”
Consider how compactness is the reason why “defending deep and narrow” is any good at all.
It’s interesting how different teams interpret compactness differently e.g. Barcelona and Mourinho’s Inter.
As a final note, it’s interesting that the way players move both individually and as a team are at least as important as the players selected, the type of player selected, and the formation used. Any comments to the effect that “this formation was bound to lose” is clearly false, as a comparison between Mourinho and Leonardo’s Inter shows.
[Written as a comment on www.zonalmarking.net run by Michael Cox - not just extremely knowledgeable, but a great guy]
The real point hasn’t quite been hit yet although the point about the midfield superiority comes closest. Milan were very COMPACT without the ball, Inter weren’t. Mourinho’s Inter’s outstanding feature was its compactness. No spaces were left for the opposition and even when out of possession they looked like a team in control. Everyone speaks of the Barcelona Semi Final and how compact Inter were then but it’s true of every game, it just stands out then because they made no attempt to attack.
When Inter had the ball you could count 7 or 8 Milan players in 1/4 of the pitch. When Milan had the ball – exacerbated by the way Pandev, Eto’o and Pazzini were deployed – Inter had that number in half the pitch. Milan were about twice as compact. This meant when Inter had the ball they had very little space and if they found some there were two players immediately on the player. The sight of Sneijder diving before taking out his frustration on the pitch in the first half is symptomatic of the difference between the two sides.
Conversely, when Milan had the ball they had a lot more time and space to pick a pass. They exploited this well, playing ball after ball behind the helpless defence. Inter’s lack of compactness also helped Milan keep the ball for long periods of the second half. When Inter did win the ball there was a big gap between defence and attack and so launching a counter attack was difficult.
Remaining compact is vital in the modern game. In fact it came out recently. I’m gonna find a quote….
Capello:
“Plan A is 9-1. This is the new football. The new system is to go forward with a lot of players and to defend with nine. You have to be compact. Barcelona and Arsenal do it. If you want to win back the ball, you have to defend with a lot of players and attack the same.”
Consider how compactness is the reason why “defending deep and narrow” is any good at all.
It’s interesting how different teams interpret compactness differently e.g. Barcelona and Mourinho’s Inter.
As a final note, it’s interesting that the way players move both individually and as a team are at least as important as the players selected, the type of player selected, and the formation used. Any comments to the effect that “this formation was bound to lose” is clearly false, as a comparison between Mourinho and Leonardo’s Inter shows.
[Written as a comment on www.zonalmarking.net run by Michael Cox - not just extremely knowledgeable, but a great guy]
Friday 18 March 2011
Who's feeling blue?
After Real Madrid's convincing 4-1 aggregate victory over Lyon, Mourinho fired the first shot in preparing his side for the Champions League Quarter Finals:
To most it is a statement of desire. A desire not to play certain teams. Or perhaps one of apprehension at the prospect of having to play against his former clubs. However as so often when managers speak, he is not speaking to inform but speaking to gain an advantage.
Mourinho will be hoping to draw Schalke - now managerless and floundering in 10th position in das Bundesliga. If they do draw Schalke Mourinho will emphasise how important it is to remain concentrated against all opposition in the Champions League. He will probably look to play up the importance of their key players, piling pressure onto them to perform. Incidentally, their strikers - Huntelaar and Raul - are both ex Madrid. It would be highly unusual for him not to pass comment on Raul's beautiful past with the club, looking to create the tie into an emotional encounter to take the edge off his performance. Privately he will be concerned that the team will react like a wounded beast - they have, after all, nothing else to play for.
The other team he will want to draw are Shaktar Donetsk. Along with the usual comments about not underestimating any side at this stage of the competition, Mourinho will focus on the beautiful feeling of playing at this stage of the competition. Shaktar have the weight of a nation on their shoulders and so it would seem opportune to focus on increasing this pressure, whilst emphasising how normal it is for a club of Real Madrid's stature to be playing a Quarter Final.
Whilst publicly he will play up Tottenham's talented squad - he is a known admirer of Bale, having tried to buy him whilst at Inter - privately he will be satisfied to draw the North London club. They are largely inexperienced at this level and have probably reached as far as they can go. Expect Mourinho to be hugely complementary about their performances so far. This should force them to reflect on their incredible achievements so far, lessening their bite in this game. If they go out, they might reason, they will have achieved something glorious already.
Barcelona are not a team they will want to face, and an unholy war of words followed by some resolute defending and lightening counter attacking will ensue in the event of such a draw. Mourinho will emphasise again how his teams peak in their second season and that they have done well to reach this stage - something they hadn't previously achieved in 6 years. Expect this to be accompanied by an extremely gritty performance.
Manchester United are a team severely hampered by injury. In any event Mourinho has only ever spoken of Ferguson in glowing terms.
This leaves Inter and Chelsea. By placing the emphasis on how difficult it is to play your friends he is already evoking emotions in the players who love him. This is a building block upon which to build further monuments to glories past.
Mourinho is a clever man.
I prefer to avoid Chelsea and Inter, because emotionally it's difficult playing against your people and your friends.
To most it is a statement of desire. A desire not to play certain teams. Or perhaps one of apprehension at the prospect of having to play against his former clubs. However as so often when managers speak, he is not speaking to inform but speaking to gain an advantage.
Mourinho will be hoping to draw Schalke - now managerless and floundering in 10th position in das Bundesliga. If they do draw Schalke Mourinho will emphasise how important it is to remain concentrated against all opposition in the Champions League. He will probably look to play up the importance of their key players, piling pressure onto them to perform. Incidentally, their strikers - Huntelaar and Raul - are both ex Madrid. It would be highly unusual for him not to pass comment on Raul's beautiful past with the club, looking to create the tie into an emotional encounter to take the edge off his performance. Privately he will be concerned that the team will react like a wounded beast - they have, after all, nothing else to play for.
The other team he will want to draw are Shaktar Donetsk. Along with the usual comments about not underestimating any side at this stage of the competition, Mourinho will focus on the beautiful feeling of playing at this stage of the competition. Shaktar have the weight of a nation on their shoulders and so it would seem opportune to focus on increasing this pressure, whilst emphasising how normal it is for a club of Real Madrid's stature to be playing a Quarter Final.
Whilst publicly he will play up Tottenham's talented squad - he is a known admirer of Bale, having tried to buy him whilst at Inter - privately he will be satisfied to draw the North London club. They are largely inexperienced at this level and have probably reached as far as they can go. Expect Mourinho to be hugely complementary about their performances so far. This should force them to reflect on their incredible achievements so far, lessening their bite in this game. If they go out, they might reason, they will have achieved something glorious already.
Barcelona are not a team they will want to face, and an unholy war of words followed by some resolute defending and lightening counter attacking will ensue in the event of such a draw. Mourinho will emphasise again how his teams peak in their second season and that they have done well to reach this stage - something they hadn't previously achieved in 6 years. Expect this to be accompanied by an extremely gritty performance.
Manchester United are a team severely hampered by injury. In any event Mourinho has only ever spoken of Ferguson in glowing terms.
This leaves Inter and Chelsea. By placing the emphasis on how difficult it is to play your friends he is already evoking emotions in the players who love him. This is a building block upon which to build further monuments to glories past.
Mourinho is a clever man.
Wednesday 9 March 2011
How Goals Are Scored - Penalties
A penalty kick is seen as a favourable situation for the attacking team. Given to penalise defending teams who commit fouls close to the goal, their obvious likelihood of resulting in a goal provides a disincentive for the defending team to prevent goal scoring opportunities by unfair means. Last year in the Premier League 79.94% were successfully converted.
It is often assumed that the striker picks his spot, and scores or misses depending on his ability to execute the simple technical demands of the situation. However, it is not that simple. There are two further pressures which make it more difficult for the penalty taker than first seems. The first is simple and reflects the psychological pressure present during most spot kicks. The second is a more complex case of the technical demands evolving as a result of increased use of technology and better goalkeeping.
Psychological Pressure
The psychological pressures of a penalty kick are brought into relief by a problem a friend put me a few weeks ago: how can a professional ever miss a simple penalty kick when they are capable of doing other things regularly which are so much more difficult? Players can regularly place a 20 yard pass accurately to feet. Why can't they play a 12 yard shot accurately to within the same small area of the goal?
The answer is that there are several layers of psychological pressure being exerted on the individual, particularly during a shoot out but also during a standard penalty, that aren't present during a standard 20 yard pass.
Firstly, a goal is cruelly and obviously at stake. This makes the technical demands of the situation more pressured than for any other outfield situation. Football is a low scoring game and so the opportunity to score is highly prized. Only a good shooting opportunity (e.g. a 1 on 1) presents the same clear cut, high reward situation. Goalkeepers routinely deal with knowing that one mistake can lead to a goal and so confidence and mental robustness are prerequisites for development in a way which isn't quite true for most outfield positions (Alex Welsh goalkeeping coach for many years at Arsenal, now at Tottenham, has said all coaching sessions are designed with the explicit aim of making goalkeepers more confident). Outfield players rarely feel the same strain and a high level of resilience isn't a prerequisite for success on pitch as it is in goal.
(As an aside, the pressure in a shoot out is flipped from the goalkeeper to the striker during a penalty shoot out. See here for a quote to that effect by Brad Friedel and some tips on how to save a penalty.)
Secondly, the kick taker has time to reflect on his own abilities and what's at stake. During open play, players act largely on instinct built up through repeated exposure to game situations. They trust themselves to make good decisions under pressure because they have been there before. The game is largely instinctual. Once the time is taken to consider performance the natural rhythms of unconscious competence are disrupted. Good performance is a function of relaxed arousal. This means being relaxed, and OUT OF YOUR HEAD. This is the state when humans feel best, and perform to the utmost of their abilities.
The minute or so (minimum) between realising you will be taking a penalty and striking the ball creates a vacuum which is filled with introspection when at that moment what you need is a burst of extroversion, whilst all the while remaining relaxed. No rush of blood to the head. No introspection.
Relaxed. Arousal.
Focused and calm.
Thirdly, players have expectations projected onto them by their team mates and coaches. Because the advantage is on the taker this will manifest itself as pressure to score. Feelings of letting the team down, destroying days/weeks/months of hard work or on the flip side having to live up to expectations can all inhibit performance.
Just as hanging out with a relaxed group of friends can aid your own relaxation, or passing a funeral cortège can make you feel sad, being surrounded by nervous peers can amplify your own nervousness. There is a draw towards the centre. Humanity's natural tendency to empathise with other humans is amplified within the context of a team because of the joint range of experiences they have shared together (this is the basis for empathy).
Fourthly, the crowd, television audience, the nation, and family/friends can all be remote factors which increase the opportunity cost of missing. These external factors also increase the cost of failing. Score and it is expected, miss and a wide range of external sources will see you miss. Your status within the group is no longer assured and a host of other negative rationalisations can follow all leading to a drop in self esteem.
Fifthly, the goalkeeper can pile on psychological pressure by moving on the line, or shaking his arms about, or by being outright daft like this. This reduced the ability of the striker to remain in relaxed arousal as the taker loses focus. Alternatively, it is extremely common for the defending side to protest for as long as possible before the kick is taken to maximise the amount of time the striker has to wait before taking the kick.
During Everton's recent penalty shoot out victory over Chelsea, Heitinga knocked into Cole as he walked up to take his penalty. Cole then went on to miss.
Sixthly, and this applies predominantly to penalty shoot outs, the psychological and physical stress the player is under is exacerbated by tiredness. A penalty shoot out happens only after two hours of football. Ouch!
Finally, goalkeepers will know who is likely to take a penalty on the opposing side and will have studied where they like to place the ball (trends emerge strongly as humans resort to comfort in times of stress, see also: chocolate nibbling, cigarette smoking etc).
The striker then has to be comfortable putting the ball in several different places. It is a psychological dare: can you put the ball where you are not most comfortable?
Technical Pressure
The technical pressure was first brought to my attention by Bob Wilson in the London FA magazine. The technical pressures at the top level are such that they make every single piece of advice given on the above link (with the Brad Friedel quote) redundant.
Over the past 20 years goalkeepers have become very good at predicting where a striker will shoot based on body position, length of run up, and whether their weight is shifted forwards (low shot) or backwards (high shot). In order to counteract this, penalty takers have done two things:
1) Smashed the ball as hard as possible, usually low. Power over placement. This is exemplified by the classic Frank Lampard penalty.
2) Alternatively players have developed such strong technique that they are capable of shaping to shoot one way and in the same movement, wrap their foot around the ball such that they shoot the other. This is a progression of the classic, pretend to shoot-pause-wait til the keeper has dived-then send it the other way routine.
Enter: Messi.
Here he shapes to shoot to his left. His planted foot is besides the ball pointing in the direction he should be shooting. He has also opened up his body as though he were going to shoot across the goal.
However his striking foot - imperceptibly to the 'keeper - is starting to do something interesting.
Instead he wraps his foot around the ball to shoot to his right.
The effect is to take away the goalkeeper's ability to predict where the striker will shoot. This explains why Almunia appeared not to dive. He was going to dive to his right but saw the ball going to his left so was made to look silly.
However this technique also increases the technical demands of the situation. Where previously it was a very simple action to perform, it now becomes more technically difficult at a time when there is plenty of psychological pressure anyway.
Conclusion
1) The most technically proficient players are most likely to perform well under pressure.
2) Do not emphasise what is at stake. Minimise all thinking. The player should be concentrating only on their kick as they take it. A penalty shoot out is not the time for epic speeches about the hands of destiny. Emphasise togetherness no matter what. Football is a team sport and is won and lost by the entire squad, not be individual players or actions.
A penalty shoot out is probably too late to introduce this. A penalty during open play is certainly too late. It is a feeling that the players should live with at all times. A player that feels like they have the support of their team mates, coaches and fans is more likely to cope with the demands of taking a penalty. A team that feels like it has the trust of the media, fans and other external sources, will also be more likely to succeed. This work is done every day.
Anyone want to hazard a guess why England are perennial losers at penalty shoot outs and Germany have only ever missed 4 at World Cup Finals, including penalty shoot outs?
3) Practice is only useful if you can mimic the mental and physical pressures of taking a kick e.g. after an intense session where all players are tired. Consider mimicking the "in your head" aspect by stipulating that players can only take a penalty with their weaker foot.
5) Smile as you take the penalty. Smiling releases a shot of endorphins. This will aid relaxation.
Tuesday 22 February 2011
Short Passing - Level 2
This is a link to a pdf file with a suggested session. Short passing is the most basic technical component of the game. It is important to have high standards for short passing.
If it seems like an easy topic to coach, it isn't. It is easy to pass the Level 2 course with. It is easy to do a decent job of. To do a very good job, which as a coach you should be trying to do.. it isn't. The drill set ups are very simple. The key is in getting the players to make sensible decisions and remaining technically strong whilst under pressure. The drill should inspire confidence and challenge.
If it seems like an easy topic to coach, it isn't. It is easy to pass the Level 2 course with. It is easy to do a decent job of. To do a very good job, which as a coach you should be trying to do.. it isn't. The drill set ups are very simple. The key is in getting the players to make sensible decisions and remaining technically strong whilst under pressure. The drill should inspire confidence and challenge.
Wednesday 16 February 2011
In Defence of Milan
Last night Milan were beaten by Tottenham 1-0 at the San Siro. There has been much criticism both of Milan and the Italian league in response, but most of it has been misguided.
Milan were missing key players
Milan were missing Pirlo and Ambrosini who are both vital to their passing game. When they play, the midfield three are not so tight and so the side play with more width. When weaker passers of the ball take their place - Gattusso and Flamini - the midfield has to remain more compact as the range of passing is more limited.
It is also worth mentioning that Nesta has only just recovered from injury. In fact just about the only side harder hit by injuries than Tottenham are Milan.
See also: Cup tied van Bommel and Cassano.
Milan's focus is the league - Tottenham's is the CL.
Milan's signings this year have all pointed towards a desire to win the league. Ibrahimovic has won 8 straight league titles in three countries and has always made the different in Serie A.
Cassano and van Bommel cup tied and have represented Sampdoria and Bayern Munich respectively already in the Champions League. Signed to bolster an injury ravaged squad, it seems there is clearly an emphasis on gaining their first league title since 2004.
Tottenham by contrast are taking part for the first time in decades and have a desire to impress. Given a choice between 5th in the League and a Champions League semi final or 4th in the league and elimination to AC Milan, most fans would probably opt for the exciting European run...
This comes down to a question of motivation.
Had Yepes scored they would almost certainly be taking a lead to London.
Only a couple of fantastic Gomes saves kept Tottenham in it.
Milan were incredibly dirty.
Yes. But it's worth noting that Joe Jordan, Tottenham's assistant manager, is accused of instigating the tensions. Whilst Gatusso is to blame - and he has publicly apologised for his actions, accepting responsibility - it seems to have been a tactic of Jordan's to wind up the notoriously volatile Italian.
This is reminiscent of Mourinho instructing his players to wind up Drogba during their Second Round clash last year, which eventually resulted in his dismissal after a tempestuous stamp on Motta, with whom he had feuded all evening.
Comparing Serie A and EPL is dumb
2 years ago the eventual Premier League winners (Manchester United) knocked out the Serie A champions (Inter) comfortably.
Last year the Serie A champions (Inter) knocked out the eventual Premier League winners (Chelsea) comfortably.
This year the Premier League's 5th place team beats Serie A's 1st place team in the first leg.
It is simply not possible to extrapolate from a single game, the relative strengths of two leagues. It is a nonsense which has been repeated widely in the past day.
Milan's old men couldn't cope with the speed of a Premier League team
Spurs are a fast side and it is true that Lennon's pace was crucial for the goal. However there is an assumption that The EPL is so fast you need special goggles to watch it. This is an assumption that I have never seen challenged. The number of teams who move the ball about as quickly as Barcelona and Villarreal over short distances are ONE: Arsenal. Are players in England really faster (without the ball) than players elsewhere? How do you know? With the ball Krasic, Messi, and Robben are at least as fast and tricky as Walcott, Lennon or Nani.
Sure if you compare Milan - a team renowned for being slow - with Tottenham - a team renowned with being fast, then you might be tempted to draw grand conclusions about the two leagues. But compare Chelsea with Roma and you may well find the opposite to be true.
In any event a Milan side stripped of Pirlo, Ambrosini, Van Bommel and Cassano were always going to lack that spark that a good passing game or an unexpected dribble can provide. Nobody wonders whether Barcelona will struggle because Busquets, Xavi and Iniesta are slower without the ball, because in their heads they are two steps ahead anyway. They know what they will do with the ball before they get it. It is this experience and intelligence that Milan lacked more than an ability to "get physical".
It was a tight game with some close calls on either side (Milan might well have had both Flamini and Gatusso sent off just as Ibrahimovic's late equaliser was dubiously chalked off). Tottenham leave with a slender win. It is tempting to say they deserved it but this would surely be a reflection of our desire to support plucky underdog over ageing, established giants. Milan's behaviour - particularly that of (surprise, surprise) Flamini and Gatusso - was far from sporting at times. Nonetheless, it was a tight game and not one from which we should be making grand pronouncements about either side.
The second leg will be tight. An early goal could see Milan defend narrow and deep with no space in behind for Tottenham to exploit, being content instead to hit hard on the conterattack wth Robinho and Pato. Expect Milan to be far more aggressive in the second leg - as they were in the second half - looking for that early away goal.
But with Milan still unable to field Pirlo, Cassano or Van Bommel, Tottenham should still win. Expect a tense game.
Milan were missing key players
Milan were missing Pirlo and Ambrosini who are both vital to their passing game. When they play, the midfield three are not so tight and so the side play with more width. When weaker passers of the ball take their place - Gattusso and Flamini - the midfield has to remain more compact as the range of passing is more limited.
It is also worth mentioning that Nesta has only just recovered from injury. In fact just about the only side harder hit by injuries than Tottenham are Milan.
See also: Cup tied van Bommel and Cassano.
Milan's focus is the league - Tottenham's is the CL.
Milan's signings this year have all pointed towards a desire to win the league. Ibrahimovic has won 8 straight league titles in three countries and has always made the different in Serie A.
Cassano and van Bommel cup tied and have represented Sampdoria and Bayern Munich respectively already in the Champions League. Signed to bolster an injury ravaged squad, it seems there is clearly an emphasis on gaining their first league title since 2004.
Tottenham by contrast are taking part for the first time in decades and have a desire to impress. Given a choice between 5th in the League and a Champions League semi final or 4th in the league and elimination to AC Milan, most fans would probably opt for the exciting European run...
This comes down to a question of motivation.
Had Yepes scored they would almost certainly be taking a lead to London.
Only a couple of fantastic Gomes saves kept Tottenham in it.
Milan were incredibly dirty.
Yes. But it's worth noting that Joe Jordan, Tottenham's assistant manager, is accused of instigating the tensions. Whilst Gatusso is to blame - and he has publicly apologised for his actions, accepting responsibility - it seems to have been a tactic of Jordan's to wind up the notoriously volatile Italian.
This is reminiscent of Mourinho instructing his players to wind up Drogba during their Second Round clash last year, which eventually resulted in his dismissal after a tempestuous stamp on Motta, with whom he had feuded all evening.
Comparing Serie A and EPL is dumb
2 years ago the eventual Premier League winners (Manchester United) knocked out the Serie A champions (Inter) comfortably.
Last year the Serie A champions (Inter) knocked out the eventual Premier League winners (Chelsea) comfortably.
This year the Premier League's 5th place team beats Serie A's 1st place team in the first leg.
It is simply not possible to extrapolate from a single game, the relative strengths of two leagues. It is a nonsense which has been repeated widely in the past day.
Milan's old men couldn't cope with the speed of a Premier League team
Spurs are a fast side and it is true that Lennon's pace was crucial for the goal. However there is an assumption that The EPL is so fast you need special goggles to watch it. This is an assumption that I have never seen challenged. The number of teams who move the ball about as quickly as Barcelona and Villarreal over short distances are ONE: Arsenal. Are players in England really faster (without the ball) than players elsewhere? How do you know? With the ball Krasic, Messi, and Robben are at least as fast and tricky as Walcott, Lennon or Nani.
Sure if you compare Milan - a team renowned for being slow - with Tottenham - a team renowned with being fast, then you might be tempted to draw grand conclusions about the two leagues. But compare Chelsea with Roma and you may well find the opposite to be true.
In any event a Milan side stripped of Pirlo, Ambrosini, Van Bommel and Cassano were always going to lack that spark that a good passing game or an unexpected dribble can provide. Nobody wonders whether Barcelona will struggle because Busquets, Xavi and Iniesta are slower without the ball, because in their heads they are two steps ahead anyway. They know what they will do with the ball before they get it. It is this experience and intelligence that Milan lacked more than an ability to "get physical".
It was a tight game with some close calls on either side (Milan might well have had both Flamini and Gatusso sent off just as Ibrahimovic's late equaliser was dubiously chalked off). Tottenham leave with a slender win. It is tempting to say they deserved it but this would surely be a reflection of our desire to support plucky underdog over ageing, established giants. Milan's behaviour - particularly that of (surprise, surprise) Flamini and Gatusso - was far from sporting at times. Nonetheless, it was a tight game and not one from which we should be making grand pronouncements about either side.
The second leg will be tight. An early goal could see Milan defend narrow and deep with no space in behind for Tottenham to exploit, being content instead to hit hard on the conterattack wth Robinho and Pato. Expect Milan to be far more aggressive in the second leg - as they were in the second half - looking for that early away goal.
But with Milan still unable to field Pirlo, Cassano or Van Bommel, Tottenham should still win. Expect a tense game.
Sunday 13 February 2011
Player centric metric
Wayne Rooney scored a wonderful goal yesterday. Match of the Day, not the worst football show by far, concentrated on the technical execution by Rooney. It was truly an incredible strike.
But what made the goal truly special was the one touch build up. Scholes rescues the situation with a one touch ball out to Nani under pressure, and Nani delivers a sublime cross into Rooney. And nothing was said of it. Nothing. View it here from 14 minutes:
That is symptomatic of the Sky Sportsification of football in this country. In our quest for a hero we trumpet the achievement of the individual over the team.
Kenny Dalglish coming out and saying that no one man is bigger than the club was heartening.
The Messi v Ronaldo battles in recent friendlies and classicos, the focus on goal rather than build up, the journalistic quest for contrived controversy or tension... these things detract from the real beauty of the game: how to build a team of successful players. In a derby where styles are so strongly conflicting this hook was available.
Manchester United have the longest average time spent per player at any European club. Giggs and Scholes were instrumental in both goals, the second of which came from a brilliant team move. Manchester City are a hastily arranged team of expensive stars with seemingly little direction. There is no guiding light, no philosophy, no direction. And despite flashes of brilliance, they looked incredibly disjointed. In high pressure moments, feeling comfortable is key. Manchester United know each other extremely well: Manchester City feels like a 21st Century reconstruction of Babel.
The interesting issue isn't (just) a well executed volley, that every top forward could execute on the training ground.
But what made the goal truly special was the one touch build up. Scholes rescues the situation with a one touch ball out to Nani under pressure, and Nani delivers a sublime cross into Rooney. And nothing was said of it. Nothing. View it here from 14 minutes:
That is symptomatic of the Sky Sportsification of football in this country. In our quest for a hero we trumpet the achievement of the individual over the team.
Kenny Dalglish coming out and saying that no one man is bigger than the club was heartening.
The Messi v Ronaldo battles in recent friendlies and classicos, the focus on goal rather than build up, the journalistic quest for contrived controversy or tension... these things detract from the real beauty of the game: how to build a team of successful players. In a derby where styles are so strongly conflicting this hook was available.
Manchester United have the longest average time spent per player at any European club. Giggs and Scholes were instrumental in both goals, the second of which came from a brilliant team move. Manchester City are a hastily arranged team of expensive stars with seemingly little direction. There is no guiding light, no philosophy, no direction. And despite flashes of brilliance, they looked incredibly disjointed. In high pressure moments, feeling comfortable is key. Manchester United know each other extremely well: Manchester City feels like a 21st Century reconstruction of Babel.
The interesting issue isn't (just) a well executed volley, that every top forward could execute on the training ground.
Friday 11 February 2011
Xavi Interview
It's here.
I'm posting it because Xavi makes exactly the points I have made recently (up to yesterday). It's almost like I read this interview before deciding what to write at times.
On space: "Think quickly, look for spaces. That's what I do: look for spaces. All day. I'm always looking. All day, all day.. Space, space, space. It's like being on the PlayStation.. I see the space and pass. That's what I do"
On developing youngsters: "Some youth academies worry about winning, we worry about education. You see a kid who lifts his head up, who plays the pass first time, pum, and you think, 'Yep, he'll do.' Bring him in, coach him. Our model was imposed by [Johan] Cruyff; it's an Ajax model. It's all about rondos [piggy in the middle]. Rondo, rondo, rondo. Every. Single. Day. It's the best exercise there is. You learn responsibility and not to lose the ball. If you lose the ball, you go in the middle. Pum-pum-pum-pum, always one touch."
On developing more youngsters:Education is the key. Players have had 10 or 12 years here. When you arrive at Barça the first thing they teach you is: think. Think, think, think. Quickly. [Xavi starts doing the actions, looking around himself.] Lift your head up, move, see, think. Look before you get the ball. If you're getting this pass, look to see if that guy is free. Pum. First time.
On playing a passing game: "My football is passing but, wow, if I have Dani, Iniesta, Pedro, [David] Villa … there are so many options"
On Paul Scholes: Paul Scholes! A role model. For me – and I really mean this – he's the best central midfielder I've seen in the last 15, 20 years. I've spoken to Xabi Alonso about him. He's spectacular, he has it all: the last pass, goals, he's strong, he doesn't lose the ball, vision. If he'd been Spanish he might have been rated more highly. Players love him.
Voila.
I'm posting it because Xavi makes exactly the points I have made recently (up to yesterday). It's almost like I read this interview before deciding what to write at times.
On space: "Think quickly, look for spaces. That's what I do: look for spaces. All day. I'm always looking. All day, all day.. Space, space, space. It's like being on the PlayStation.. I see the space and pass. That's what I do"
On developing youngsters: "Some youth academies worry about winning, we worry about education. You see a kid who lifts his head up, who plays the pass first time, pum, and you think, 'Yep, he'll do.' Bring him in, coach him. Our model was imposed by [Johan] Cruyff; it's an Ajax model. It's all about rondos [piggy in the middle]. Rondo, rondo, rondo. Every. Single. Day. It's the best exercise there is. You learn responsibility and not to lose the ball. If you lose the ball, you go in the middle. Pum-pum-pum-pum, always one touch."
On developing more youngsters:Education is the key. Players have had 10 or 12 years here. When you arrive at Barça the first thing they teach you is: think. Think, think, think. Quickly. [Xavi starts doing the actions, looking around himself.] Lift your head up, move, see, think. Look before you get the ball. If you're getting this pass, look to see if that guy is free. Pum. First time.
On playing a passing game: "My football is passing but, wow, if I have Dani, Iniesta, Pedro, [David] Villa … there are so many options"
On Paul Scholes: Paul Scholes! A role model. For me – and I really mean this – he's the best central midfielder I've seen in the last 15, 20 years. I've spoken to Xabi Alonso about him. He's spectacular, he has it all: the last pass, goals, he's strong, he doesn't lose the ball, vision. If he'd been Spanish he might have been rated more highly. Players love him.
Voila.
Thursday 10 February 2011
Passing and Failing
One of the most common phrases in football parlance is, "create an angle". This is a term which offends my maths consciousness so much it makes me want to wipe out a protractor, jab at the offender's face till they apologise, then lay them out perpendicular to common sense and reason until they promise not to be such a cliché ridden gimp forever and ever. Returning from anger management classes I would then show them this post.
As with most clichés there is an interesting observation to be found somewhere. That somewhere is here. It is in the angles found. Lateral passes should not be the first port of call for a player. They are generally played to feet and tend to slow down play instead of speeding it up. They suffer from a deficiency of one of the key reasons we pass the ball at all: to penetrate the opposition defence.
Lateral passes do have their place though. With some clever movement they can be devastating. Many months ago I remember seeing Scholes make a 5m run (against a team I forget) which was so astoundingly brilliant it opened my eyes to a new depth. I have recreated it here:
Man United’s opposition is defending extremely compactly. There is no space between the lines. The only free united player in a promising position is Valencia. As a result of the defending team’s compact defending he is in plenty of space. However, a ball out to him risks being intercepted by the player marked “def”. Even if he does not make it he is in a good position to close Valencia down should he receive the ball. This will buy the defending team time to shuffle across. Crucially the defender to the left of the back four does not have to commit. If he does then he leaves space in behind which Manchester United can exploit.
Scholes has a quick look behind his shoulder to check Valencia is in space. An average player might have looked to push out towards Valencia, taking the defender with him, to create more space in the middle for the player on the ball to run into. This is the danger zone after all. An aggressive run by the player with the ball into the middle area can incite a foul or lead to an opening.
What Scholes does is initially counter-intuitive. He moves into the area of high pressure thus compressing the play further, when what the attacking side actually want is MORE space. He darts inside drawing the defender with him. The defender does this to prevent Scholes having time and space on the ball in a central position. He receives the pass into feet, turns outwards and then sprays the ball over to the right wing. Valencia now has far more room in which to manoeuvre. Crucially the defender to the left of the back four must now commit to close him down. Valencia is running at pace and can either take the defender on himself, or slip the ball in behind him for the advancing forward to shoot.
It was a 5m run inside which led to the goal scoring opportunity. Movement is intimately connected to passing. With poor movement we can never truly have great passing.
Lateral passes are not necessarily bad. They can be useful to unlock tight defences when combined with good movement. Usually though they are associated with teams trying to kill a game or rest on the ball. The emphasis must be on speed of thought and action.
Ultimately though, even lateral passes should look to exploit as much space as possible.
Here, the diagonal forward pass is to be preferred to the one into feet. A pass to feet slows play down as he is further back when he receives the pass and the touch has to be heavier to redirect it in front. The player receiving is still when he takes a first touch, rather than moving. A pass in front of a player, so long as it is well weighted, speeds up play.
Look at how often Germany's passes are played in front of the player, to devastating effect, during their defeat of England last year:
Vertical passes
A diagonal pass takes longer to reach its intended target. They receiving player has more time to assess the weight of the pass and make an appropriate run. The angle at which he can approach the ball is more varied. The rectangles also mark the moments in the balls trajectory when it is opportune to take control of it. Finally, if the ball is played straight the player receiving the pass has far more work to do to use the ball productively. If he receives it facing the ball he has his back to goal and so can either play a pass back away from goal or has to turn.
A diagonal pass by contrast allows the player receiving the pass more time to turn into the pass. This is especially useful if he is marked, as he can shield the ball from the defender whilst still making progress towards the goal. Diagonal balls over a greater distance are effective as they require early decision making from those furthest away from the ball. The most penetrative ball in football is that from fullback to outside forward.
A quick note here to say that a vertical pass is one made in line with the receiver's run. In the build up to Liverpool's goal against Chelsea at the weekend Kelly played a ball straight down the line for Gerrard. Because Gerrard's run came from an angle onto the pass it was not a vertical pass as understood here.
Conclusion
Passing is the most commonly executed technical demand for a footballer. It is breathtakingly simple and yet so rarely done well. These notes underpin what it means to "create angles" and "play neat triangles". Another look at the Germany video - perhaps with the horrible sound muted this time - is vastly instructive of what good, penetrative passing should look like. I can't remember a Brazil side that's looked as good as these supposedly "efficient" Germans for a long while.
It is also clear that movement off the ball effects the range and type of passes available. Good passing is at least as much a factor of the players without the ball as it is the players with the ball. If Xavi and Iniesta look quite s sublime with the ball, it is because both they, and the likes of Dani Alves, Messi, Villa, Pedro et al move sublimely off it.
As with most clichés there is an interesting observation to be found somewhere. That somewhere is here. It is in the angles found. Lateral passes should not be the first port of call for a player. They are generally played to feet and tend to slow down play instead of speeding it up. They suffer from a deficiency of one of the key reasons we pass the ball at all: to penetrate the opposition defence.
Lateral passes do have their place though. With some clever movement they can be devastating. Many months ago I remember seeing Scholes make a 5m run (against a team I forget) which was so astoundingly brilliant it opened my eyes to a new depth. I have recreated it here:
Man United’s opposition is defending extremely compactly. There is no space between the lines. The only free united player in a promising position is Valencia. As a result of the defending team’s compact defending he is in plenty of space. However, a ball out to him risks being intercepted by the player marked “def”. Even if he does not make it he is in a good position to close Valencia down should he receive the ball. This will buy the defending team time to shuffle across. Crucially the defender to the left of the back four does not have to commit. If he does then he leaves space in behind which Manchester United can exploit.
Scholes has a quick look behind his shoulder to check Valencia is in space. An average player might have looked to push out towards Valencia, taking the defender with him, to create more space in the middle for the player on the ball to run into. This is the danger zone after all. An aggressive run by the player with the ball into the middle area can incite a foul or lead to an opening.
What Scholes does is initially counter-intuitive. He moves into the area of high pressure thus compressing the play further, when what the attacking side actually want is MORE space. He darts inside drawing the defender with him. The defender does this to prevent Scholes having time and space on the ball in a central position. He receives the pass into feet, turns outwards and then sprays the ball over to the right wing. Valencia now has far more room in which to manoeuvre. Crucially the defender to the left of the back four must now commit to close him down. Valencia is running at pace and can either take the defender on himself, or slip the ball in behind him for the advancing forward to shoot.
It was a 5m run inside which led to the goal scoring opportunity. Movement is intimately connected to passing. With poor movement we can never truly have great passing.
Lateral passes are not necessarily bad. They can be useful to unlock tight defences when combined with good movement. Usually though they are associated with teams trying to kill a game or rest on the ball. The emphasis must be on speed of thought and action.
Ultimately though, even lateral passes should look to exploit as much space as possible.
Here, the diagonal forward pass is to be preferred to the one into feet. A pass to feet slows play down as he is further back when he receives the pass and the touch has to be heavier to redirect it in front. The player receiving is still when he takes a first touch, rather than moving. A pass in front of a player, so long as it is well weighted, speeds up play.
Look at how often Germany's passes are played in front of the player, to devastating effect, during their defeat of England last year:
Vertical passes
A diagonal pass takes longer to reach its intended target. They receiving player has more time to assess the weight of the pass and make an appropriate run. The angle at which he can approach the ball is more varied. The rectangles also mark the moments in the balls trajectory when it is opportune to take control of it. Finally, if the ball is played straight the player receiving the pass has far more work to do to use the ball productively. If he receives it facing the ball he has his back to goal and so can either play a pass back away from goal or has to turn.
A diagonal pass by contrast allows the player receiving the pass more time to turn into the pass. This is especially useful if he is marked, as he can shield the ball from the defender whilst still making progress towards the goal. Diagonal balls over a greater distance are effective as they require early decision making from those furthest away from the ball. The most penetrative ball in football is that from fullback to outside forward.
A quick note here to say that a vertical pass is one made in line with the receiver's run. In the build up to Liverpool's goal against Chelsea at the weekend Kelly played a ball straight down the line for Gerrard. Because Gerrard's run came from an angle onto the pass it was not a vertical pass as understood here.
Conclusion
Passing is the most commonly executed technical demand for a footballer. It is breathtakingly simple and yet so rarely done well. These notes underpin what it means to "create angles" and "play neat triangles". Another look at the Germany video - perhaps with the horrible sound muted this time - is vastly instructive of what good, penetrative passing should look like. I can't remember a Brazil side that's looked as good as these supposedly "efficient" Germans for a long while.
It is also clear that movement off the ball effects the range and type of passes available. Good passing is at least as much a factor of the players without the ball as it is the players with the ball. If Xavi and Iniesta look quite s sublime with the ball, it is because both they, and the likes of Dani Alves, Messi, Villa, Pedro et al move sublimely off it.
Monday 7 February 2011
FA Level 2: 10 General Points Sitting on a Wall
This is the start of a collection of posts where I run through the FA Level 2 topics. I will detail a sample of how you might want to approach such a session and the key coaching points. I will only post those I have tried and had success with in practice.
For those coaches who aren't sitting a course, this is the format:
Technique (unopposed drill)
into
Skill (opposed drill)
(combined 15 minutes)
into
Small sided game
(15 minutes)
The small sided game is currently a 4 by 4 game although you can include add-ons such as goalkeepers, floaters (players off the touchline who play for one or both teams but can't enter the field of play), or a golden player (a player who plays for whichever team has the ball).
You must pick a side to coach and coach these 4 players and only these four players.
For those who are doing a coaching course or coach themselves, this is the best website I've come across. It is simply fantastic.
General Tips
1) It seems obvious, but you need to have a team you are coaching. This is easy as there are hundreds of grass roots positions available up and down the country. If you are struggling in London then ask.
2) The first time you put on a session it will suck. That's just the way it is. To maximise the benefit from this first session plan meticulously, then put it on. Organisation is key. Ask yourself how clearly the session is targeting the topic it is meant to cover. Ask yourself whether health and safety has been respected. Ask yourself whether you have all the equipment you need, especially colour coded bibs and cones. Ask yourself whether the technique, skill and small sided game move smoothly into each other.
3) Once you have the session organised well (and this will get easier with time), you can focus on technical content. You have to be able to see what is going on. Write down a list of all the things you expect to see. My final topic was 'forward runs without the ball' and I knew I could count on over laps, underlaps, runs from behind the ball, runs in front of the ball to create space, runs in front of the ball to exploit space, combinations of these, counter attacks... so I got used to seeing these. I asked myself which teams were good at forward runs off the ball. Teams you might want to consider include Germany, Barcelona and Arsenal. Watch matches and ISOLATE THE TOPIC.
To become a good coach you have to be able to switch off 'fan' mode and see what's really going on.
Having watched games for your topic(s), use this knowledge to make the session relevant to the session. For my final topic I used MESSI as an example from a recent Classico. Not only did it show I had understood the topic as practiced in the real world, it made the topic come alive to those participating. Further, everyone tried super hard and had fun trying to emulate Messi's sharp runs.
4) Ask yourself whether you can make your session MORE REALISTIC or MORE FUN.
5) Practice it at least 3/4 times in total. More if you can.
6) Can you introduce a rule to isolate a particular topic? I knew an important part of forward runs without the ball was counter attacking so for just a couple of minutes I introduced a rule whereby a team had to make three passes with all their players in their own half before moving forward. This would encourage the defending team to press up high and leave space in behind to exploit, which I could then coach.
Once I had coached this I took the rule away to increase the realism once more.
There is an element of box ticking during your final exam (and time pressure) that might not be present in a real coaching session.
7) Demos must follow the STOP - Demo - Recreate - Live forumla. Stop the drill AS SOON AS YOU SEE THE ERROR. This is where you must show your HIGH STANDARDS as a coach. Do not accept substandard performance. STOP can be a whistle or a command. I use "STOP, STAND STILL". "Freeze", "PAUSE", or any similar command as good as long as it is loud, clear and has the desired effect. Consistency is important so they recognise how they should behave immediately. Step in, verbalise what you're doing: "I'm going to take your place, Pete" and show them what they should have done. Then get them to show you what they should have done. Then have the game go live. Recreate the scenario AS IT WAS, not as you wish it was. If needs be, move players around to recreate it. A simple "everyone rewind 5 seconds" can often do the trick.
8) Communication style is massively important. Use a combination of telling, Q&A, checking for feedback, closed questions, open questions and suggestion. It is particularly useful to ask questions as this requires an active approach to learning from the players. They have to consider the various possibilities and then select one.
It is also important to make your instructions as clear as possible. This means SIMPLICITY. Do not try to do too much. As the FA encourage: let the game be the teacher.
This isn't given much time on coaching courses, but a good manner is the difference between a good session and an excellent one. Style should never replace substance, but it can definitely amplify it.
9) Football is competitive and competition can be fun. Add it in at opportune moments. At the end of my technique to skill segment I gave them a challenge to be the first player to score three points. This was well received and added further to the enjoyment of the session.
An academy coach last week improved small sided games by only allowing goals if the players celebrated afterwards!
10) I am not a big fan of visualisation normally, but it can really help. First up, here's what I think it does not do:
- It does not replace practice
- It does not improve your technical knowledge
- It does not make you a hippy
What it does do is make you more relaxed and confident. Let's say you put on your session 4 times in the real world such that you know you have put on a good session. An excellent way to increase your confidence in putting on the session in the future is to create more reference points in your head by running through your session FROM START TO FINISH in your head. You can do this in bed before you drift off to sleep. It cements organisation and by imagining your A game performance you reinforce the idea that you can do very well.
This all works because imagination and memory share the same neurological circuits.
I was given the highest praise on my course and I put this down to feeling relaxed and confident, partly from being well prepared and partly through visualisation.
************
These points will really help you pass the course but more importantly become a better coach. Everything comes down to points two and four: good organisation and MORE FUN, MORE REALISM.
Enjoy coaching!
For those coaches who aren't sitting a course, this is the format:
Technique (unopposed drill)
into
Skill (opposed drill)
(combined 15 minutes)
into
Small sided game
(15 minutes)
The small sided game is currently a 4 by 4 game although you can include add-ons such as goalkeepers, floaters (players off the touchline who play for one or both teams but can't enter the field of play), or a golden player (a player who plays for whichever team has the ball).
You must pick a side to coach and coach these 4 players and only these four players.
For those who are doing a coaching course or coach themselves, this is the best website I've come across. It is simply fantastic.
General Tips
1) It seems obvious, but you need to have a team you are coaching. This is easy as there are hundreds of grass roots positions available up and down the country. If you are struggling in London then ask.
2) The first time you put on a session it will suck. That's just the way it is. To maximise the benefit from this first session plan meticulously, then put it on. Organisation is key. Ask yourself how clearly the session is targeting the topic it is meant to cover. Ask yourself whether health and safety has been respected. Ask yourself whether you have all the equipment you need, especially colour coded bibs and cones. Ask yourself whether the technique, skill and small sided game move smoothly into each other.
3) Once you have the session organised well (and this will get easier with time), you can focus on technical content. You have to be able to see what is going on. Write down a list of all the things you expect to see. My final topic was 'forward runs without the ball' and I knew I could count on over laps, underlaps, runs from behind the ball, runs in front of the ball to create space, runs in front of the ball to exploit space, combinations of these, counter attacks... so I got used to seeing these. I asked myself which teams were good at forward runs off the ball. Teams you might want to consider include Germany, Barcelona and Arsenal. Watch matches and ISOLATE THE TOPIC.
To become a good coach you have to be able to switch off 'fan' mode and see what's really going on.
Having watched games for your topic(s), use this knowledge to make the session relevant to the session. For my final topic I used MESSI as an example from a recent Classico. Not only did it show I had understood the topic as practiced in the real world, it made the topic come alive to those participating. Further, everyone tried super hard and had fun trying to emulate Messi's sharp runs.
4) Ask yourself whether you can make your session MORE REALISTIC or MORE FUN.
5) Practice it at least 3/4 times in total. More if you can.
6) Can you introduce a rule to isolate a particular topic? I knew an important part of forward runs without the ball was counter attacking so for just a couple of minutes I introduced a rule whereby a team had to make three passes with all their players in their own half before moving forward. This would encourage the defending team to press up high and leave space in behind to exploit, which I could then coach.
Once I had coached this I took the rule away to increase the realism once more.
There is an element of box ticking during your final exam (and time pressure) that might not be present in a real coaching session.
7) Demos must follow the STOP - Demo - Recreate - Live forumla. Stop the drill AS SOON AS YOU SEE THE ERROR. This is where you must show your HIGH STANDARDS as a coach. Do not accept substandard performance. STOP can be a whistle or a command. I use "STOP, STAND STILL". "Freeze", "PAUSE", or any similar command as good as long as it is loud, clear and has the desired effect. Consistency is important so they recognise how they should behave immediately. Step in, verbalise what you're doing: "I'm going to take your place, Pete" and show them what they should have done. Then get them to show you what they should have done. Then have the game go live. Recreate the scenario AS IT WAS, not as you wish it was. If needs be, move players around to recreate it. A simple "everyone rewind 5 seconds" can often do the trick.
8) Communication style is massively important. Use a combination of telling, Q&A, checking for feedback, closed questions, open questions and suggestion. It is particularly useful to ask questions as this requires an active approach to learning from the players. They have to consider the various possibilities and then select one.
It is also important to make your instructions as clear as possible. This means SIMPLICITY. Do not try to do too much. As the FA encourage: let the game be the teacher.
This isn't given much time on coaching courses, but a good manner is the difference between a good session and an excellent one. Style should never replace substance, but it can definitely amplify it.
9) Football is competitive and competition can be fun. Add it in at opportune moments. At the end of my technique to skill segment I gave them a challenge to be the first player to score three points. This was well received and added further to the enjoyment of the session.
An academy coach last week improved small sided games by only allowing goals if the players celebrated afterwards!
10) I am not a big fan of visualisation normally, but it can really help. First up, here's what I think it does not do:
- It does not replace practice
- It does not improve your technical knowledge
- It does not make you a hippy
What it does do is make you more relaxed and confident. Let's say you put on your session 4 times in the real world such that you know you have put on a good session. An excellent way to increase your confidence in putting on the session in the future is to create more reference points in your head by running through your session FROM START TO FINISH in your head. You can do this in bed before you drift off to sleep. It cements organisation and by imagining your A game performance you reinforce the idea that you can do very well.
This all works because imagination and memory share the same neurological circuits.
I was given the highest praise on my course and I put this down to feeling relaxed and confident, partly from being well prepared and partly through visualisation.
************
These points will really help you pass the course but more importantly become a better coach. Everything comes down to points two and four: good organisation and MORE FUN, MORE REALISM.
Enjoy coaching!
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)