Inter v Schalke Decompacted

Inter Milan v Schalke 04 by DeezRed77

At 2-1 the big chances had fallen Inter's way. They were ostensibly looking good. Their lack of compactness - a crime at this stage of the Champions League - proved their undoing.

Inter have just won the ball back. Then we have a ball that both Cambiasso and Sneijder tried to play frequently (with some success) all night: a diagonal ball to a forward. This time the forward is...Thiago Motta.


Look how close Sneijder, Cambiasso and Zanetti are. You'd think they were U10s who struggle to play a longer pass. The support play here is poor. There is no adequate transition from defence to attack. The strategy appear to be to spray balls in to the forward.


However, even with good passers, a long pass is risky business. The ball is miscontrolled and the defender takes the ball passing it forward. Notice now how they have 3 players around the ball (as Inter had). However they have a lot more space in which to advance. This time Inter's problem is the transition from attack to defence. 3 of Inter's midfielders were within 10 m of the lefthand touchline and so have a mission to resume central positions (the fourth, Thiago Motta, has bombed forward despite having lost it). The result of this is that having won the ball Schalke can travel 20m up the pitch without facing so much as a sniff of a challenge. There is no threat to the ball and their attack builds momentum IMMEDIATELY. There is no pause to consider which intricate pass to play, no problem solving required. Head up - GO!


As we can see here the two Inter players closest to the ball (Stankovic and Sneijder) will be easily split by a pass.


Schalke now have pace and momentum in their favour as they have a retreating defence to beat. It took 15 seconds from the moment the pass in the first frame was made to the ball being in the back of the net.

Inter's lack of compactness and positional awareness in midfield are compounded because they lack pace. Cambiasso, Stankovic, Thiago Motta and Sneijder are terrific players who are all worthy of being European Champions but none of them have much pace. To allow three of those midfielders to exhibit such a small area of the pitch is asking for trouble when playing risky balls forward to a defensive midfielder (as they did to Motta). This problem is compounded when you consider that the defence is also very slow. Zanetti is 37 and Chivu and Rannocchia are both SLOW. By not playing compactly you invite pressure onto the defence and they are made to do the one thing they least want to do: backtrack at pace. Introduce a player like Jefferson Farfan into the equation and you are asking for trouble.

This problem is not new. Benitez tried to play a high line earlier in the season and was consistently taken apart by teams who were pacey (Bale's annihilation of Inter's fastest defender Maicon stands out). You can only play a high line if you are EXTREMELY aggressive in midfield and win the ball back quickly denying the opposition midfield time and space on the ball to pick out those long passes behind the defence.

This problem is particularly frustrating because it was the principle problem during the Milan derby.

Everything Mourinho's side was - deep, aggressive, disciplined, compact, excellent at transitions - this side is not. Mourinho's side wouldn't have conceded such a sloppy goal at a corner. They wouldn't have left such big spaces after they lost the ball. Excellent players would have seemed like the best in the world (Cambiasso, Sneijder, Milito..).

Schalke themselves were poor leaving far too many spaces for Inter's static midfield and forward line but they were not Treble winners last year.

Oh how the mighty fall.

Team Philosophy - Team like a Spring

I have found an analogy for how I believe a team should play. It is simple and effective but not intended to be holistic. It is simply this: a team should play like a spring.

When territorial pressure is applied to the side, players - like the springs of a coil - should get closer together, winding ever more tightly. The more pressure that is applied on the side, the closer they should get and the harder they should work for each other. If under mental stress it is similarly important that the side binds together in these moments rather than fracturing. The more you push a spring the more resistance you encounter. Once that pressure is released it springs back. The greater the force applied to it, the harder and faster it bounces back. A football team should also bounce back quickly on the counter attack if put under a lot of pressure.

This is the basic idea. I shall now explain in more detail.

Without the ball it is vital to be compact. The closer to goal the opposition get, the more important it is to remain compact and deny space. The person on the ball must be denied time on the ball and the space closed so that good movement is less effective. The opposition must be made to risk possession. This must be done as a TEAM. In order to remain truly compact the whole team must be in the smallest area of the pitch possible whilst maintaining good depth.

Positioning must also facilitate transitions into the attacking phase. Like a spring, the more pressure that is exerted on the team the quicker this transition must be. This is because a team that has committed more men forwards has left more space in defence. It is this space that the transition must look to exploit quickly. However, if possession has been regained inside the opposition half there are likely to be fewer spaces to exploit. Here it is not so opportune to strike quickly but instead to keep possession.

When attacking the most important attribute is SUPPORT PLAY. How well do those players off the ball support the player with the ball? A team that can provide good options will attack effectively. On the counter attack this is particularly important, but in any event the aim is to exploit any space left by the opposition QUICKLY.

The most important attribute of the attacking team is to be PROACTIVE or, more simply, PLAY TO WIN. Don't play not to lose. Play to win. Take risks, try to be play that killer ball. Make the defence uncertain and nervous.

The other team should spend far more time wondering how to counteract you, than the other way around.

Play to win.

Finally I think formations are already far less important than systems of play and it is easy to imagine a time when formations become obsolete as a way of describing tactics. Teams increasingly must attack and defend together. Spalletti's Roma played a 4-6-0 and this will prove to be the way teams play in the future. Versatile players like Messi, Ronaldo, Rooney, Nasri, Alves, Lucio, and even Wilshere are very much the future of the game. Players must be capable of playing between the lines, as comfortable with the ball at feet as they are defending, as comfortable passing as they are making surging runs forward.

Football is at an exciting moment in its development. The birth of new, more fluid ideas (I have previously referenced the "formlessness" discussed in the Art of Way) mean that tactics are very much enjoying a rebirth: their very own spring.

On Milan v Inter

In the face of criticism of the players used, I dont think anyone’s mentioned that the personnel was very similar to that used by Mourinho in the CL final last year. 4 defenders, 2 holding players and Sneijder, Eto’o, Pandev, Milito/Pazzini. The problem was not inflexibility in that regard because Mourinho’s players played very differently from Leonardo’s.

The real point hasn’t quite been hit yet although the point about the midfield superiority comes closest. Milan were very COMPACT without the ball, Inter weren’t. Mourinho’s Inter’s outstanding feature was its compactness. No spaces were left for the opposition and even when out of possession they looked like a team in control. Everyone speaks of the Barcelona Semi Final and how compact Inter were then but it’s true of every game, it just stands out then because they made no attempt to attack.

When Inter had the ball you could count 7 or 8 Milan players in 1/4 of the pitch. When Milan had the ball – exacerbated by the way Pandev, Eto’o and Pazzini were deployed – Inter had that number in half the pitch. Milan were about twice as compact. This meant when Inter had the ball they had very little space and if they found some there were two players immediately on the player. The sight of Sneijder diving before taking out his frustration on the pitch in the first half is symptomatic of the difference between the two sides.

Conversely, when Milan had the ball they had a lot more time and space to pick a pass. They exploited this well, playing ball after ball behind the helpless defence. Inter’s lack of compactness also helped Milan keep the ball for long periods of the second half. When Inter did win the ball there was a big gap between defence and attack and so launching a counter attack was difficult.

Remaining compact is vital in the modern game. In fact it came out recently. I’m gonna find a quote….

Capello:

“Plan A is 9-1. This is the new football. The new system is to go forward with a lot of players and to defend with nine. You have to be compact. Barcelona and Arsenal do it. If you want to win back the ball, you have to defend with a lot of players and attack the same.”

Consider how compactness is the reason why “defending deep and narrow” is any good at all.

It’s interesting how different teams interpret compactness differently e.g. Barcelona and Mourinho’s Inter.

As a final note, it’s interesting that the way players move both individually and as a team are at least as important as the players selected, the type of player selected, and the formation used. Any comments to the effect that “this formation was bound to lose” is clearly false, as a comparison between Mourinho and Leonardo’s Inter shows.

[Written as a comment on www.zonalmarking.net run by Michael Cox - not just extremely knowledgeable, but a great guy]

Who's feeling blue?

After Real Madrid's convincing 4-1 aggregate victory over Lyon, Mourinho fired the first shot in preparing his side for the Champions League Quarter Finals:

I prefer to avoid Chelsea and Inter, because emotionally it's difficult playing against your people and your friends.

To most it is a statement of desire. A desire not to play certain teams. Or perhaps one of apprehension at the prospect of having to play against his former clubs. However as so often when managers speak, he is not speaking to inform but speaking to gain an advantage.

Mourinho will be hoping to draw Schalke - now managerless and floundering in 10th position in das Bundesliga. If they do draw Schalke Mourinho will emphasise how important it is to remain concentrated against all opposition in the Champions League. He will probably look to play up the importance of their key players, piling pressure onto them to perform. Incidentally, their strikers - Huntelaar and Raul - are both ex Madrid. It would be highly unusual for him not to pass comment on Raul's beautiful past with the club, looking to create the tie into an emotional encounter to take the edge off his performance. Privately he will be concerned that the team will react like a wounded beast - they have, after all, nothing else to play for.

The other team he will want to draw are Shaktar Donetsk. Along with the usual comments about not underestimating any side at this stage of the competition, Mourinho will focus on the beautiful feeling of playing at this stage of the competition. Shaktar have the weight of a nation on their shoulders and so it would seem opportune to focus on increasing this pressure, whilst emphasising how normal it is for a club of Real Madrid's stature to be playing a Quarter Final.

Whilst publicly he will play up Tottenham's talented squad - he is a known admirer of Bale, having tried to buy him whilst at Inter - privately he will be satisfied to draw the North London club. They are largely inexperienced at this level and have probably reached as far as they can go. Expect Mourinho to be hugely complementary about their performances so far. This should force them to reflect on their incredible achievements so far, lessening their bite in this game. If they go out, they might reason, they will have achieved something glorious already.

Barcelona are not a team they will want to face, and an unholy war of words followed by some resolute defending and lightening counter attacking will ensue in the event of such a draw. Mourinho will emphasise again how his teams peak in their second season and that they have done well to reach this stage - something they hadn't previously achieved in 6 years. Expect this to be accompanied by an extremely gritty performance.

Manchester United are a team severely hampered by injury. In any event Mourinho has only ever spoken of Ferguson in glowing terms.

This leaves Inter and Chelsea. By placing the emphasis on how difficult it is to play your friends he is already evoking emotions in the players who love him. This is a building block upon which to build further monuments to glories past.

Mourinho is a clever man.

How Goals Are Scored - Penalties

A penalty kick is seen as a favourable situation for the attacking team. Given to penalise defending teams who commit fouls close to the goal, their obvious likelihood of resulting in a goal provides a disincentive for the defending team to prevent goal scoring opportunities by unfair means. Last year in the Premier League 79.94% were successfully converted.

It is often assumed that the striker picks his spot, and scores or misses depending on his ability to execute the simple technical demands of the situation. However, it is not that simple. There are two further pressures which make it more difficult for the penalty taker than first seems. The first is simple and reflects the psychological pressure present during most spot kicks. The second is a more complex case of the technical demands evolving as a result of increased use of technology and better goalkeeping.

Psychological Pressure

The psychological pressures of a penalty kick are brought into relief by a problem a friend put me a few weeks ago: how can a professional ever miss a simple penalty kick when they are capable of doing other things regularly which are so much more difficult? Players can regularly place a 20 yard pass accurately to feet. Why can't they play a 12 yard shot accurately to within the same small area of the goal?
The answer is that there are several layers of psychological pressure being exerted on the individual, particularly during a shoot out but also during a standard penalty, that aren't present during a standard 20 yard pass.

Firstly, a goal is cruelly and obviously at stake. This makes the technical demands of the situation more pressured than for any other outfield situation. Football is a low scoring game and so the opportunity to score is highly prized. Only a good shooting opportunity (e.g. a 1 on 1) presents the same clear cut, high reward situation. Goalkeepers routinely deal with knowing that one mistake can lead to a goal and so confidence and mental robustness are prerequisites for development in a way which isn't quite true for most outfield positions (Alex Welsh goalkeeping coach for many years at Arsenal, now at Tottenham, has said all coaching sessions are designed with the explicit aim of making goalkeepers more confident). Outfield players rarely feel the same strain and a high level of resilience isn't a prerequisite for success on pitch as it is in goal.

(As an aside, the pressure in a shoot out is flipped from the goalkeeper to the striker during a penalty shoot out. See here for a quote to that effect by Brad Friedel and some tips on how to save a penalty.)

Secondly, the kick taker has time to reflect on his own abilities and what's at stake. During open play, players act largely on instinct built up through repeated exposure to game situations. They trust themselves to make good decisions under pressure because they have been there before. The game is largely instinctual. Once the time is taken to consider performance the natural rhythms of unconscious competence are disrupted. Good performance is a function of relaxed arousal. This means being relaxed, and OUT OF YOUR HEAD. This is the state when humans feel best, and perform to the utmost of their abilities.

The minute or so (minimum) between realising you will be taking a penalty and striking the ball creates a vacuum which is filled with introspection when at that moment what you need is a burst of extroversion, whilst all the while remaining relaxed. No rush of blood to the head. No introspection.

Relaxed. Arousal.

Focused and calm.

Thirdly, players have expectations projected onto them by their team mates and coaches. Because the advantage is on the taker this will manifest itself as pressure to score. Feelings of letting the team down, destroying days/weeks/months of hard work or on the flip side having to live up to expectations can all inhibit performance.

Just as hanging out with a relaxed group of friends can aid your own relaxation, or passing a funeral cortège can make you feel sad, being surrounded by nervous peers can amplify your own nervousness. There is a draw towards the centre. Humanity's natural tendency to empathise with other humans is amplified within the context of a team because of the joint range of experiences they have shared together (this is the basis for empathy).

Fourthly, the crowd, television audience, the nation, and family/friends can all be remote factors which increase the opportunity cost of missing. These external factors also increase the cost of failing. Score and it is expected, miss and a wide range of external sources will see you miss. Your status within the group is no longer assured and a host of other negative rationalisations can follow all leading to a drop in self esteem.

Fifthly, the goalkeeper can pile on psychological pressure by moving on the line, or shaking his arms about, or by being outright daft like this. This reduced the ability of the striker to remain in relaxed arousal as the taker loses focus. Alternatively, it is extremely common for the defending side to protest for as long as possible before the kick is taken to maximise the amount of time the striker has to wait before taking the kick.

During Everton's recent penalty shoot out victory over Chelsea, Heitinga knocked into Cole as he walked up to take his penalty. Cole then went on to miss.


Sixthly, and this applies predominantly to penalty shoot outs, the psychological and physical stress the player is under is exacerbated by tiredness. A penalty shoot out happens only after two hours of football. Ouch!

Finally, goalkeepers will know who is likely to take a penalty on the opposing side and will have studied where they like to place the ball (trends emerge strongly as humans resort to comfort in times of stress, see also: chocolate nibbling, cigarette smoking etc).

The striker then has to be comfortable putting the ball in several different places. It is a psychological dare: can you put the ball where you are not most comfortable?

Technical Pressure

The technical pressure was first brought to my attention by Bob Wilson in the London FA magazine. The technical pressures at the top level are such that they make every single piece of advice given on the above link (with the Brad Friedel quote) redundant.

Over the past 20 years goalkeepers have become very good at predicting where a striker will shoot based on body position, length of run up, and whether their weight is shifted forwards (low shot) or backwards (high shot). In order to counteract this, penalty takers have done two things:

1) Smashed the ball as hard as possible, usually low. Power over placement. This is exemplified by the classic Frank Lampard penalty.

2) Alternatively players have developed such strong technique that they are capable of shaping to shoot one way and in the same movement, wrap their foot around the ball such that they shoot the other. This is a progression of the classic, pretend to shoot-pause-wait til the keeper has dived-then send it the other way routine.

Enter: Messi.



Here he shapes to shoot to his left. His planted foot is besides the ball pointing in the direction he should be shooting. He has also opened up his body as though he were going to shoot across the goal.
However his striking foot - imperceptibly to the 'keeper - is starting to do something interesting.



Instead he wraps his foot around the ball to shoot to his right.

The effect is to take away the goalkeeper's ability to predict where the striker will shoot. This explains why Almunia appeared not to dive. He was going to dive to his right but saw the ball going to his left so was made to look silly.

However this technique also increases the technical demands of the situation. Where previously it was a very simple action to perform, it now becomes more technically difficult at a time when there is plenty of psychological pressure anyway.

Conclusion

1) The most technically proficient players are most likely to perform well under pressure.

2) Do not emphasise what is at stake. Minimise all thinking. The player should be concentrating only on their kick as they take it. A penalty shoot out is not the time for epic speeches about the hands of destiny. Emphasise togetherness no matter what. Football is a team sport and is won and lost by the entire squad, not be individual players or actions.
A penalty shoot out is probably too late to introduce this. A penalty during open play is certainly too late. It is a feeling that the players should live with at all times. A player that feels like they have the support of their team mates, coaches and fans is more likely to cope with the demands of taking a penalty. A team that feels like it has the trust of the media, fans and other external sources, will also be more likely to succeed. This work is done every day.

Anyone want to hazard a guess why England are perennial losers at penalty shoot outs and Germany have only ever missed 4 at World Cup Finals, including penalty shoot outs?

3) Practice is only useful if you can mimic the mental and physical pressures of taking a kick e.g. after an intense session where all players are tired. Consider mimicking the "in your head" aspect by stipulating that players can only take a penalty with their weaker foot.

5) Smile as you take the penalty. Smiling releases a shot of endorphins. This will aid relaxation.

Short Passing - Level 2

This is a link to a pdf file with a suggested session. Short passing is the most basic technical component of the game. It is important to have high standards for short passing.

If it seems like an easy topic to coach, it isn't. It is easy to pass the Level 2 course with. It is easy to do a decent job of. To do a very good job, which as a coach you should be trying to do.. it isn't. The drill set ups are very simple. The key is in getting the players to make sensible decisions and remaining technically strong whilst under pressure. The drill should inspire confidence and challenge.

In Defence of Milan

Last night Milan were beaten by Tottenham 1-0 at the San Siro. There has been much criticism both of Milan and the Italian league in response, but most of it has been misguided.

Milan were missing key players

Milan were missing Pirlo and Ambrosini who are both vital to their passing game. When they play, the midfield three are not so tight and so the side play with more width. When weaker passers of the ball take their place - Gattusso and Flamini - the midfield has to remain more compact as the range of passing is more limited.

It is also worth mentioning that Nesta has only just recovered from injury. In fact just about the only side harder hit by injuries than Tottenham are Milan.

See also: Cup tied van Bommel and Cassano.

Milan's focus is the league - Tottenham's is the CL.

Milan's signings this year have all pointed towards a desire to win the league. Ibrahimovic has won 8 straight league titles in three countries and has always made the different in Serie A.

Cassano and van Bommel cup tied and have represented Sampdoria and Bayern Munich respectively already in the Champions League. Signed to bolster an injury ravaged squad, it seems there is clearly an emphasis on gaining their first league title since 2004.

Tottenham by contrast are taking part for the first time in decades and have a desire to impress. Given a choice between 5th in the League and a Champions League semi final or 4th in the league and elimination to AC Milan, most fans would probably opt for the exciting European run...

This comes down to a question of motivation.

Had Yepes scored they would almost certainly be taking a lead to London.

Only a couple of fantastic Gomes saves kept Tottenham in it.

Milan were incredibly dirty.
Yes. But it's worth noting that Joe Jordan, Tottenham's assistant manager, is accused of instigating the tensions. Whilst Gatusso is to blame - and he has publicly apologised for his actions, accepting responsibility - it seems to have been a tactic of Jordan's to wind up the notoriously volatile Italian.

This is reminiscent of Mourinho instructing his players to wind up Drogba during their Second Round clash last year, which eventually resulted in his dismissal after a tempestuous stamp on Motta, with whom he had feuded all evening.

Comparing Serie A and EPL is dumb

2 years ago the eventual Premier League winners (Manchester United) knocked out the Serie A champions (Inter) comfortably.
Last year the Serie A champions (Inter) knocked out the eventual Premier League winners (Chelsea) comfortably.
This year the Premier League's 5th place team beats Serie A's 1st place team in the first leg.

It is simply not possible to extrapolate from a single game, the relative strengths of two leagues. It is a nonsense which has been repeated widely in the past day.

Milan's old men couldn't cope with the speed of a Premier League team

Spurs are a fast side and it is true that Lennon's pace was crucial for the goal. However there is an assumption that The EPL is so fast you need special goggles to watch it. This is an assumption that I have never seen challenged. The number of teams who move the ball about as quickly as Barcelona and Villarreal over short distances are ONE: Arsenal. Are players in England really faster (without the ball) than players elsewhere? How do you know? With the ball Krasic, Messi, and Robben are at least as fast and tricky as Walcott, Lennon or Nani.

Sure if you compare Milan - a team renowned for being slow - with Tottenham - a team renowned with being fast, then you might be tempted to draw grand conclusions about the two leagues. But compare Chelsea with Roma and you may well find the opposite to be true.

In any event a Milan side stripped of Pirlo, Ambrosini, Van Bommel and Cassano were always going to lack that spark that a good passing game or an unexpected dribble can provide. Nobody wonders whether Barcelona will struggle because Busquets, Xavi and Iniesta are slower without the ball, because in their heads they are two steps ahead anyway. They know what they will do with the ball before they get it. It is this experience and intelligence that Milan lacked more than an ability to "get physical".


It was a tight game with some close calls on either side (Milan might well have had both Flamini and Gatusso sent off just as Ibrahimovic's late equaliser was dubiously chalked off). Tottenham leave with a slender win. It is tempting to say they deserved it but this would surely be a reflection of our desire to support plucky underdog over ageing, established giants. Milan's behaviour - particularly that of (surprise, surprise) Flamini and Gatusso - was far from sporting at times. Nonetheless, it was a tight game and not one from which we should be making grand pronouncements about either side.

The second leg will be tight. An early goal could see Milan defend narrow and deep with no space in behind for Tottenham to exploit, being content instead to hit hard on the conterattack wth Robinho and Pato. Expect Milan to be far more aggressive in the second leg - as they were in the second half - looking for that early away goal.

But with Milan still unable to field Pirlo, Cassano or Van Bommel, Tottenham should still win. Expect a tense game.