The video I linked to in the last post was a fantastic demonstration of Barcelona's style. What most of you would have missed is the significance of the opening segment. Watch the opening 60 seconds of the 1974 World Cup final between the Netherlands and West Germany.
The Netherlands kick of. The ball comes back to the defence. The fullbacks are pushed up as far as possible. Under pressure from the Germans the fullbacks push back in to provide support for the centrebacks. At no point do they attempt to play the long ball. The ball goes short to the rightback who then plays it straight back. These opening passes are exactly what we might expect from Barcelona. Short, simple, good movement and with a generally aggressive layout. Possession is key.
Then something really interesting happens. At 12:34 in the video a man comes running back to provide support to the centreback, just inside the leftback.He comes right the way across and picks the ball up in the centre of the pitch. The centreback then makes a darting run forward. This is not a casual jog but a concerted effort. Even Piqué would rarely make such a bold move so early on.
The man on the ball then points right. He has received support from the rightback (again). That option is closed off and so he comes inside, having complete faith in the centreback to deal with the ball. It is already clear, less than 30 seconds into the game, that we are dealing with exceptionally competent centrebacks both technically, and in terms of movement.
How many modern sides can claim such proficiency?
The player who had initially provided support reveals himself to be number 14. This player is not a defender. He is not a midfielder. He is not a winger. He is their centre forward: Johan Cruijff.
The ball is played forward and the other centreback runs forward ball at feet. The modern game perhaps has Lucio as a parallel. Regardless, the centreback looks like a midfielder on the ball. Confident, aggressive, and with a good touch. After some good interplay down the left-hand side the ball is then played back out to Cruijff at the 13:00 mark. At this stage he is the furthest outfield player back for the Netherlands and is still in the opposition half. Let's be clear here: the centre forward is the player furthest back whilst in possession. From there his dribble is as scintillating as anything Messi has put in. He wins a penalty less than 60 seconds into the World Cup Final.
What is the point of all this?
There is nothing in football that is new today. Sacchi probably made the last great tactical innovation through his holistic approach to both attacking and defending. Since then there has been nothing new. A lot has been made of the False 9 position made famous by Messi. As this video shows, it is tame compared to Cruijff (himself the driving force behind Barcelona's philosophy) and the Netherlands. Similarly attacking fullbacks, centrebacks who are good on the ball, and versatile players are all hailed as important reasons behind successful modern teams. All these are correct. None of them are modern inventions.
Having said this, one aspect of the game is very different from the 1970s. The physical conditioning of players (though Arsenal fans may sometimes wonder) is much improved. Players are expected to lead more professional lifestyles, adhering to good diets and refraining from excesses mid-season. The effect of this is to allow heavier pressing for longer. If this had been available to the Total Football experiment of the 1970s then it might well have been more successful.
If you want to understand the direction the game is headed in, then one could do worse than consider the following: all players are exhibiting greater midfield tendencies.
Barthez, France's World Cup and European Championship winning goalkeeper, spoke of national training camps where every player - himself included - had to practice a variety of long and short passes. A level of technical proficiency was required of each player. Distribution from the 'keeper is becoming increasingly important. Long hoofs up the pitch are becoming increasingly rare, even from the floor.
As fitness improves forwards are increasingly being encouraged to press from the front. This means defenders are required to have a better first touch, greater awareness, better movement, better passing and greater composure. In short, they have to display midfield tendencies. Lucio, Piqué and David Luiz are the future. And this is just the centrebacks. The preponderance of 4-3-3 style formations mean that it is vital for fullbacks to be able to provide attacking width. I can't think of a technically competent fullback at a top club. Note that this is still not new. Both sides in the 1974 World Cup final played a 4-3-3 with technically sound fullbacks.The difference is that sides now are becoming increasingly forced to develop technically sound defenders as sides press from the front and defences are becoming harder to unlock. Previously these talents were a luxury. Now they are a necessity.
Let's be clear what this means: attackers are pressing and defenders are attacking. Every player must be able to dabble in every part of the game. Everyone must display midfield tendencies.
The effect on academies is strong. At Spurs - and this is by no means exclusive - players are only assigned a position when they are 15. Before that everyone must understand all the key elements of the game to a strong level. This reflects the demands of the modern game. Forwards must learn how to jockey and defenders must be comfortable playing one-twos. This broader understanding of the game also fosters a greater collective empathy. It also produces pros who can adapt to any given situation.
Have a look at the England U21s training:
It's a great move (see point 2 for the conditions)
So far I have referred to technical competence. By this I mean not just classic competencies such as passing, controlling, and shooting. I also mean good movement, intelligent decision making and team understanding (the social aspect). As a coach this can be done simply by imposing conditions on games. Here are two quick examples.
1) Set up a 3 v 3 (with or without additional goalkeepers). Each side can only have a maximum of 2 players in a half at a time. This ensures that players understand that if one player goes, another must stay. They also have to decide whether to track runs of the opposition or create controlled overloads. This involves decision making and good communication.
2) More simply, impose two touch. Players must then focus on their first touch and where they play it with their second. It also encourages players to think about where their teammates are constantly as if they start looking when they receive the ball they will almost certainly lose it. The space of the pitch and the number of touches players have can be modified to make it harder or easier, as appropriate.
The focus on positions from a young age is destructive to the development of our young players. This mindset must be trained out of both players and coaches at all levels if England are to compete at the highest level. Every player needs to have midfield tendencies. The seeds are there. They must be allowed to grow.
Sunday, 4 September 2011
Saturday, 3 September 2011
A nice video
Credit must go to this fantastic German language site for bringing the video below to my attention. It is an analysis of how Barcelona play. It stood out because of its technical content. No journalist I have read will provide such a good rendition of how they play. The person who uploaded it is almost certainly a coach. Enjoy!
Stay tuned this weekend for comment on "Midfield Tendencies" covering everything from attacking fullbacks, to the false 9, from total football to the present Barcelona side.
Monday, 20 June 2011
How to Beat Barcelona - diagrams
To add to yesterday's post, here is a diagram explaining the basic shape and movements visually.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting a cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributes required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Furthermore both are comfortable ball at feet and so will have the necessary composure in pressured situations. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting a cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributes required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Furthermore both are comfortable ball at feet and so will have the necessary composure in pressured situations. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
How to Beat Barcelona - diagrams
To add to yesterday's post, here is a diagram explaining the basic shape and movements visually.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting a cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributes required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting a cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributes required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
How to Beat Barcelona - diagrams
To add to yesterday's post, here is a diagram explaining the basic shape and movements visually.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributed required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
Defence
In defence it is vital to remain compact. This area - highlighted by the red rectangle - is key. Barcelona will play endless sideways passes quietly probing until space appears. The defending side must defend the space, not the ball. The front four must help win the ball back and their willingness to track back and be aggressive in their pressing is key to putting Barcelona under pressure higher up the field. However, in deeper areas, that red square must never be conceded.
Number 8 and Number 11 are particularly important in tracking the runs made by Dani Alves and Puyol/Abidal. Supposing Alves is the more aggressive of the two fullbacks in pushing forward. The striker (No 9) must assume a position just in the space left by Alves. The central defender (Puyol/Mascherano) then has a choice: follow the forward and be dragged out of position, or leave him alone in space.
In transitioning from defence to attack it is important to have a clear idea which side you are going to target, leftback or rightback. Pace is essential and both the three midfield players (Nos 6, 7 and 10) and the three forwards (Nos 8, 9, 11) need to be able to anticipate what will happen very quickly to evade Barcelona's intense pressing.
The correct player to target is the weaker one or the player more likely to be found higher up the pitch. Dani Alves is an obvious target and despite his incredible stamina, would surely be put to the test by a concerted effort to undermine his attacking tendencies through direct passes into the space he has left.
Abidal might also be a target on the left. However, having played at centreback he is a formidable defender. Iniesta, Pedro and Messi practice their dribbling on him as he is seen as the toughest Barcelona defender to beat 1 on 1. His positioning is excellent and he isn't quite as gung-ho as Alves. Alternatively, when Puyol plays, his game is more conservative so there is less space to exploit.
On the counter attack quickly exploiting space is key and so the right side is probably a better option. An industrial, energetic player with decent technical attributes would be the ideal player for this role. Park ji-Sung, Tevez, or Marcelo are all ideal players for this role.
Attacking
Just as the defensive phase of the game must have one eye on a quick attacking transition, the attacking phase of the game must have one eye on a quick defensive transition. This must place an emphasis on halting the Barcelona counter attack immediately.
In the diagram above, our rightback has the ball in an advanced position with the winger creating the overlap. If he loses the ball - as happened for Inter's third goal against Barcelona - our Number 7 must win it back immediately. Our number 6 is placed to cover him. The two shielding players - 6 and 7 - apply the same theory of compactness in attack as in defence. If Barcelona do win the ball back then it must be won back immediately. This is essentially what Barcelona do so well themselves.
The aim of the attacking phase is to overload the fullback by using one of our fullbacks and a winger to create a 2 v 1 situation. This leaves our centre forward, opposing winger and No 10 to attack the box at the near post, far post and centre whilst awaiting cross. Barcelona do not have a tall side and look suspect in the air (as Ronaldo proved in the Copa del Rey final).
During a spell of sustained pressure the leftback would be a better person to attack. This is because Villa is reticent to trackback to help. As he doesn't track back, Barcelona are either easily overloaded on that side, or they commit men from the centre to compensate and so are prone to a switch. That switch will be exposed by No 8 and 10 in the above diagram.
The attributed required of the No 11 are different from that of the No 8. He must be capable of taking on the left back. An extremely technically adept player is required. Players like Eto'o, Di Maria, Valencia and Sanchez would all be perfect at playing that role.
Finally, the No 10 is crucial in this role. He must have an eye for goal and be a formidable passer of the ball with vision, composure and a quick burst of pace. He must also be willing to drop deep to help the holding players when necessary and press religiously. Rooney has an eye for goal and works hard, but in many other regards is lacking for this role. Sneijder, Modric, Oezil or Sahin are perfect for this role.
Conclusion
There is not an awful lot to conclude here. I will instead end with a suggestion as to the Real Madrid side that I feel would pose the greatest threat to Barcelona and a caveat on this whole exercise. For the former task, I shall assume Real Madrid complete the signing of Coentrao but that they make no other signings.
Given the player types listed above and in the previous post this team is self explanatory. Pepe and Carvalho both love a fight and will not be outdone with gamesmanship. Ramos is good going forward, and a safe defender. Coentrao makes it 3 out of 4 Portuguese at the back. Real Madrid could create the overload with both their fullbacks.
Diarra and Alonso hold. Until Pepe's sending off in the first leg last year they closed down the space very well. Over the period of the four games the holding screen generally did a good job at 11 v 11 so this is not too much of a problem. Alonso is a better passer than Cambiasso and Motta combined so should be the perfect player to quickly exploit space left by fullbacks.
Marcelo is strong going forward, decent technically and would have the desire and ability to track Alves's runs. Di Maria needs to show greater consistency and character in big games but at the moment he is the best Madrid have. His dribbling ability and end product must both make a step up, but if he can do it then he could prove a dangerous weapon.
Sahin, having played deeper as well as in the no 10 role for Dortmund, would be ideal for the No 10 role. With an excellent shot, quality passing and the industry to press and help out his team mates he fulfils all that is expected of this role.
Finally Ronaldo. Cannot be left out and is exceptional in the air, something Madrid need to exploit from set pieces. Let someone else take freekicks and corners. He needs to be on the end of crosses.
Now for the caveat...
Barcelona changed massively from the 09/10 season to the 10/11 season. A similar leap could make a lot of this redundant. The signing of Rossi would definitely signal a change in strategy: Sanchez less so. In any event, no team is going to start favourites against Barcelona. Fortunately, that is not the aim. The aim is a victory, and that is altogether possible.
Sunday, 19 June 2011
How to Beat Barcelona - Case Study v Inter
My last post was somewhat vague. This post centres on Barcelona's biggest loss of the past two years. Not the biggest by margin - Hercules beat them 2-0 at the Nou Camp in the second game of this season just past - but also by occasion, a Champions League semi-final no less. Now before I begin, many will recall the volcano which disrupted their preparations, forcing them to travel by coach. An entirely valid point but worth tempering by the realisation that they were not on a school trip to Dover. Money could not buy a more comfortable coach. It was also true that Barcelona were missing Iniesta. Similarly valid, but it seems to be as much a criticism as an excuse to blame a two goal defeat on the absence of one player.
It's worth noting that Sky got the Inter tactics horribly wrong there. It is truly embarrassing that they hadn't had a researcher watch a single Inter game that season before a Champions League Semi-final. Inter played a 4-2-3-1 as they did for most of the 2009/2010 season, with Pandev on the left wing, Eto'o on the right and Milito alone upfront. This point will become extremely important later.
A quick refresher. Ibrahimovic played upfront for Barcelona. This suited Lucio and Samuel who adore a scrap. Watch Lucio's masterclass against Drogba earlier on in the competition, here. Messi played off him. Nominally he started on the right wing and cut inside but in actual fact he drifted across the width of the pitch. He did not play as the central forward he does now. That has changed. The similarity is perhaps in Messi's willingness to drop deep to collect the ball.
Before the game Mourinho said this:
This was true. However Inter's formation was perfectly designed to cope with Barcelona then, particularly Messi. Take a look at this video of Messi's touches during the game. Note the following:
1) Cambiassso and Thiago Motta provided a tight screen between Messi and the goal. This made a pass the more attractive option a lot of the time. see: 36 seconds on the video.
2) When Messi was able to isolate one of them - usually Cambiasso when Motta had got forward - the holding player would not dive in but instead stand off him, looking to hold Messi up. Motta would always be back quickly to hussle. see: 55 seconds.
3) Cesar made some terrific stops, particularly from the freekick. see: 3:35.
4) Sneijder and sometimes even Eto'o would help out if Messi dropped deep. see: 1:45.
The temptation could be for Cambiasso and Motta to come out to pressure Messi when he gets closer to his backline but this makes the side less compact. As Mourinho said after the 2nd leg, Inter never wanted to surrender their position. Moving the defensive shield forward leaves a gap in front of the defenders to exploit.
This point is really brought into relief when you consider the dishevelled defending Inter displayed at home to Barcelona earlier in the season. Watch it here. When Messi has the ball he is confronted by a scattered defence. Zanetti and Motta performed the holding roles and it failed to work. Zanetti in particular was torn apart.
The difference? Compactness and positional discipline. The embodiment of this was Cambiasso. He rightly drew a lot of praise for his semi-final performances. Here is his 1st leg contribution:
Without the ball he does three things superbly. Firstly, he is extremely disciplined in shielding the defence. Motta is given free reign to move forward. Cambiasso is expected to keep his position more strictly. Secondly, his tackling was first class. Thirdly, he knew when to dive in and when to stand off. When faced with Messi he would back off forcing Messi to take the initiative. Other times he harried players on their first touch, not giving them a single metre. This puts pressure on less technically gifted players and is psychologically tough when you know that everytime you get the ball s fierce Argentine with no hair is going to bully you.
With the ball he is also interesting. He consistently targeted the position between centreback and fullback with quick balls. See 20 seconds, 39 seconds, 1 minute, 1 minute 30 seconds... among others. He rarely took the time to think about these. The reliance was on pace. This brings into play another interesting feature of Inter's game plan...
Those pesky wide players: Pandev and Eto'o. When Cambiasso had the ball he played quick balls into the space left by the advancing Brazilian fullbacks, Alves and Maxwell. By playing these balls quickly they ensured the Barcelona fullbacks didn't have time to recover. To take full advantage, Pandev and Eto'o would have been told to be extremely sharp during the transition periods. The transition against Barcelona is key because they press the ball so aggressively. In order to transition effectively against a side like Barcelona you have to identify a simple way of doing so that all involved parties will be able to execute. Exploiting that gap at fullback with players like Pandev and Eto'o seems perfect. In fact the standard model was to have Sneijder and Pandev overload the left, and Maicon and Eto'o overload the right. This left Milito free to hold more central positions and for inter to attack quickly with just 5 players.
Indeed if defensively Inter's victory can be attributed to their vertical compactness, offensively it was their lateral control which won them the match. Not only did they try to effect quick switches but all four forward players looked to exploit the space left at fullback, through quick transition play. All 3 goals came this way. Check them here from 42 seconds.
Goal 1: A quick switch by Sneijder to Eto'o seeks to exploit space down the right. Eto'o has time to chest the ball down comfortably. Milito eventually gets the ball in the middle who knocks it to Sneijder who holds his position wonderfully to score on the far side. Terrible defending by Alves but the initial overload on the right handside with Eto'o and Maicon caused panic in the Barcelona defence.
Goal 2: Sneijder surges forward with the ball. He plays a ball into Milito's diagonal run cutting out Maxwell (whose interception fails). Classic ball into that area. Yet again Maicon's appearance creates the overload, and he scores with a cool finish.
Goal 3: Maicon again forward and again not trying to be the widest player, but moving inside. Play breaks down but it is a quick ball to Eto'o who is AGAIN in space which leads to the cross from which the goal is scored.
It is clear from this that Sneijder's passing was instrumental to the first two goals. He inadvertantly set up the third. The forward's width - particularly Eto'o - resulted in all three goals. And Maicon's runs inside to give Eto'o space out wide was key in two goals and may have played a part in the third.
Deep breaths.
Inter were compact in defence. Cambiasso and Motta were key in protecting the back four, taking the pressure off Lucio and Samuel. Inter always had a spare man or two at the back because of this. Furthermore their transitions were quick, looking to exploit both space at fullback and lateral space left by intense pressing. They created an overload on Barcelona's weaker left side.
How much of this is relevant to beating Barcelona today?
Well there is no more Ibrahimovic. Messi has a more fluid role in the term, ostensibly playing as the central forward. Messi loves to drop deep and when he does there is confusion as to who should be tracking him. Playing a shield with players like Motta and Cambiasso could be key to following his runs. They should be extremely disciplined and remain close to the central defenders.
Barcelona have a greater threat on the wings now with Villa. This takes the pressure off the leftback to come forward. In big games this season Barcelona have often played Puyol there, knowing that the overlap isn't so important down the left side. However it is still true that Alves leaves space down the right to be exploited. Winning the ball on the right of midfield and playing quick balls into that space with a left winger or centre forward eager to pick up on it, perhaps with the support of a marauding leftback could be key. Alves may well be strong going forward, and his defensive frailties are often overstated, but it remains true that whilst he holds a position high up the pitch there is space in behind to be exploited.
Finally every single player must be willing to work hard an exert pressure on the ball. Sneijder helped out in the middle, Eto'o and Pandev worked incredibly hard on the wings, and Milito ran so hard he suffered from cramp. Prima donnas are not a luxury you can afford against Barcelona. This point was emphasised when Balotelli was brought on for Milito late on. Watch his exceptionally daft cameo performance here.
Players must be quick on the ball and exceptionally committed off it. As Mourinho said, the game is played 11 v 11. A simple, sobering truth.
Edit: As an aside, it was notable how often Alex Ferguson was telling his players to play wide - Rooney in particular - during the Champions League final. Where they failed, according to my above analysis, is both in protecting the back four and in transitioning quickly enough.
It's worth noting that Sky got the Inter tactics horribly wrong there. It is truly embarrassing that they hadn't had a researcher watch a single Inter game that season before a Champions League Semi-final. Inter played a 4-2-3-1 as they did for most of the 2009/2010 season, with Pandev on the left wing, Eto'o on the right and Milito alone upfront. This point will become extremely important later.
A quick refresher. Ibrahimovic played upfront for Barcelona. This suited Lucio and Samuel who adore a scrap. Watch Lucio's masterclass against Drogba earlier on in the competition, here. Messi played off him. Nominally he started on the right wing and cut inside but in actual fact he drifted across the width of the pitch. He did not play as the central forward he does now. That has changed. The similarity is perhaps in Messi's willingness to drop deep to collect the ball.
Before the game Mourinho said this:
Messi is the number one danger. He is an important player who needs major attention but, according to my culture, man-marking is impossible. It will not be one of ours against Messi and 10 against 10 others, but 11 against 11.
This was true. However Inter's formation was perfectly designed to cope with Barcelona then, particularly Messi. Take a look at this video of Messi's touches during the game. Note the following:
1) Cambiassso and Thiago Motta provided a tight screen between Messi and the goal. This made a pass the more attractive option a lot of the time. see: 36 seconds on the video.
2) When Messi was able to isolate one of them - usually Cambiasso when Motta had got forward - the holding player would not dive in but instead stand off him, looking to hold Messi up. Motta would always be back quickly to hussle. see: 55 seconds.
3) Cesar made some terrific stops, particularly from the freekick. see: 3:35.
4) Sneijder and sometimes even Eto'o would help out if Messi dropped deep. see: 1:45.
The temptation could be for Cambiasso and Motta to come out to pressure Messi when he gets closer to his backline but this makes the side less compact. As Mourinho said after the 2nd leg, Inter never wanted to surrender their position. Moving the defensive shield forward leaves a gap in front of the defenders to exploit.
This point is really brought into relief when you consider the dishevelled defending Inter displayed at home to Barcelona earlier in the season. Watch it here. When Messi has the ball he is confronted by a scattered defence. Zanetti and Motta performed the holding roles and it failed to work. Zanetti in particular was torn apart.
The difference? Compactness and positional discipline. The embodiment of this was Cambiasso. He rightly drew a lot of praise for his semi-final performances. Here is his 1st leg contribution:
Without the ball he does three things superbly. Firstly, he is extremely disciplined in shielding the defence. Motta is given free reign to move forward. Cambiasso is expected to keep his position more strictly. Secondly, his tackling was first class. Thirdly, he knew when to dive in and when to stand off. When faced with Messi he would back off forcing Messi to take the initiative. Other times he harried players on their first touch, not giving them a single metre. This puts pressure on less technically gifted players and is psychologically tough when you know that everytime you get the ball s fierce Argentine with no hair is going to bully you.
With the ball he is also interesting. He consistently targeted the position between centreback and fullback with quick balls. See 20 seconds, 39 seconds, 1 minute, 1 minute 30 seconds... among others. He rarely took the time to think about these. The reliance was on pace. This brings into play another interesting feature of Inter's game plan...
Those pesky wide players: Pandev and Eto'o. When Cambiasso had the ball he played quick balls into the space left by the advancing Brazilian fullbacks, Alves and Maxwell. By playing these balls quickly they ensured the Barcelona fullbacks didn't have time to recover. To take full advantage, Pandev and Eto'o would have been told to be extremely sharp during the transition periods. The transition against Barcelona is key because they press the ball so aggressively. In order to transition effectively against a side like Barcelona you have to identify a simple way of doing so that all involved parties will be able to execute. Exploiting that gap at fullback with players like Pandev and Eto'o seems perfect. In fact the standard model was to have Sneijder and Pandev overload the left, and Maicon and Eto'o overload the right. This left Milito free to hold more central positions and for inter to attack quickly with just 5 players.
Indeed if defensively Inter's victory can be attributed to their vertical compactness, offensively it was their lateral control which won them the match. Not only did they try to effect quick switches but all four forward players looked to exploit the space left at fullback, through quick transition play. All 3 goals came this way. Check them here from 42 seconds.
Goal 1: A quick switch by Sneijder to Eto'o seeks to exploit space down the right. Eto'o has time to chest the ball down comfortably. Milito eventually gets the ball in the middle who knocks it to Sneijder who holds his position wonderfully to score on the far side. Terrible defending by Alves but the initial overload on the right handside with Eto'o and Maicon caused panic in the Barcelona defence.
Goal 2: Sneijder surges forward with the ball. He plays a ball into Milito's diagonal run cutting out Maxwell (whose interception fails). Classic ball into that area. Yet again Maicon's appearance creates the overload, and he scores with a cool finish.
Goal 3: Maicon again forward and again not trying to be the widest player, but moving inside. Play breaks down but it is a quick ball to Eto'o who is AGAIN in space which leads to the cross from which the goal is scored.
It is clear from this that Sneijder's passing was instrumental to the first two goals. He inadvertantly set up the third. The forward's width - particularly Eto'o - resulted in all three goals. And Maicon's runs inside to give Eto'o space out wide was key in two goals and may have played a part in the third.
Deep breaths.
Inter were compact in defence. Cambiasso and Motta were key in protecting the back four, taking the pressure off Lucio and Samuel. Inter always had a spare man or two at the back because of this. Furthermore their transitions were quick, looking to exploit both space at fullback and lateral space left by intense pressing. They created an overload on Barcelona's weaker left side.
How much of this is relevant to beating Barcelona today?
Well there is no more Ibrahimovic. Messi has a more fluid role in the term, ostensibly playing as the central forward. Messi loves to drop deep and when he does there is confusion as to who should be tracking him. Playing a shield with players like Motta and Cambiasso could be key to following his runs. They should be extremely disciplined and remain close to the central defenders.
Barcelona have a greater threat on the wings now with Villa. This takes the pressure off the leftback to come forward. In big games this season Barcelona have often played Puyol there, knowing that the overlap isn't so important down the left side. However it is still true that Alves leaves space down the right to be exploited. Winning the ball on the right of midfield and playing quick balls into that space with a left winger or centre forward eager to pick up on it, perhaps with the support of a marauding leftback could be key. Alves may well be strong going forward, and his defensive frailties are often overstated, but it remains true that whilst he holds a position high up the pitch there is space in behind to be exploited.
Finally every single player must be willing to work hard an exert pressure on the ball. Sneijder helped out in the middle, Eto'o and Pandev worked incredibly hard on the wings, and Milito ran so hard he suffered from cramp. Prima donnas are not a luxury you can afford against Barcelona. This point was emphasised when Balotelli was brought on for Milito late on. Watch his exceptionally daft cameo performance here.
Players must be quick on the ball and exceptionally committed off it. As Mourinho said, the game is played 11 v 11. A simple, sobering truth.
Edit: As an aside, it was notable how often Alex Ferguson was telling his players to play wide - Rooney in particular - during the Champions League final. Where they failed, according to my above analysis, is both in protecting the back four and in transitioning quickly enough.
Sunday, 12 June 2011
How to Beat Barcelona
Watching the Champions League final I was goaded into offering my "professional" opinion on how to beat Barcelona. At the time I declined to comment. Mourinho, Ferguson and Wenger have all been beaten by two goals or more this season. It would be odd, I thought, to profess greater insight than these illustrious names. Nonetheless, for some odd reason, I find myself compelled to offer a few solutions.
1 - Muzzle Busquets
Makalele's holding role was one of the most talked about tactical developments in the last decade. His role off the ball garnered far more attention than his role in recycling possession. Once he had a man marker, he was far less effective.
Busquets role - aside from theatrically throwing himself to the floor - is to recycle possession. This means to play simple passes to keep possession rather than risk it. They only risk possession higher up the field when Xavi and Iniesta have it. What Busquets does very well is provide stability in front of the back four. Barcelona never lose possession in that dangerous area in front of the back four because Busquets is such a talented passer. When Mascherano - an inferior passer, if perhaps a better tackler - was played in that role before Christmas, Barcelona looked a lot poorer. Xavi is a big fan of Busquets, saying:
A surprising element of the Champions League Final was the amount of space Busquets frequently had. Rooney was the obvious candidate to muzzle him with suitable aggression and technical proficiency, but instead concentrated on assuming wide positions to exploit space at fullback.
A lot is said of Messi but I feel that preventing the ball from reaching him (by way of Xavi and Iniesta) is key. Prevention not cure. Muzzling Busquets could be key. This will mean the centrebacks have to spend more time on the ball. Whilst they are accomplished for centrebacks they remain the weakest outfield players on the ball. Messi may well feel compelled to come even deeper to claim the ball, and the further away from your goal Messi is, the better.
As an aside, Mourinho's tactic in the Champions League Semi-Final first leg might well have worked, had they had a player like Tevez rather than Ronaldo playing. Ronaldo's unwillingness to press makes him a luxury player at times. A player like Tevez - who has now publicly stated his unwillingness to return to Manchester - might be the perfect solution for Mourinho.
In general hard working forwards are needed to contain Barcelona's fullbacks and press from the front. Inter's 3-1 victory at home to Barcelona last season is partly testament to this.
2 - Control the momentum of the match
Momentum is fantastically important in football. A team losing 3-2 will feel very differently if they surrendered a 2-0 lead than if they have pulled two goals back in quick succession.
Barcelona do a fantastic job of controlling momentum through keeping possession. Their abundance of sideways passes which accounts for a good proportion of their ridiculously high possession statistics are not valuable in terms of match-winning merit - although some football purists certainly see it that way - but in the asphyxiating effect they have on the game. Whilst they have the ball the momentum of the game is in their hands. The other team are playing in reaction to them. Psychologically this is extremely important.
Notably when things aren't going their way they are more than happy to play dirty. Diving, hounding the referee, winding up opponents... you name it, they will do it. Whatever it takes to unnerve the opposition.
Whilst you are unlikely to be able to outpass Barcelona, disrupting their rhythm - as Real Madrid sometimes managed this season - could be key to defeating them.
An extension of this is to be mentally resilient. When you don't have the ball it is important to remain disciplined, composed, concentrated and be willing to contest every ball. A game against Barcelona will be won in the head as much as on the field.
Make the most of set-pieces
Manchester United didn't have a single corner against Barcelona in the Champions League final. When their side is so short it seems to me to be a missed opportunity. Excellently taken free kicks and corners into the penalty area are surely a good way to beat Barcelona.
Switching Play
When Barcelona lose the ball they hound the opposition very quickly in an attempt to win it back. When Inter beat Barcelona 3-1 at the San Siro, they focused on playing a lot of switches from one side of the pitch to the other. If Barcelona press aggressively it means they have fewer players elsewhere. Players like Sneijder and Xabi Alonso, combined with some positive forward play could be enough to expose Barcelona, particularly when their fullbacks hold such high positions on the field.
So, to summarise...
Pressing, fighting, crossing and switching.
Whilst this is a far from comprehensive VOILA post, it could provide some keys to beating Barcelona. The key is in playing to win and remaining compact.
It is symptomatic of the failure to beat Barcelona that sides talk predominantly about how to stop Barcelona (Xavi, Messi et al) rather than on exposing their weaknesses. A reactive strategy is not enough to beat Barcelona. The best performances have involved a strong proactive element (e.g. Arsenal at Home, and Real Madrid in the Coppa del Rey). The successful side will take the initiative.
1 - Muzzle Busquets
Makalele's holding role was one of the most talked about tactical developments in the last decade. His role off the ball garnered far more attention than his role in recycling possession. Once he had a man marker, he was far less effective.
Busquets role - aside from theatrically throwing himself to the floor - is to recycle possession. This means to play simple passes to keep possession rather than risk it. They only risk possession higher up the field when Xavi and Iniesta have it. What Busquets does very well is provide stability in front of the back four. Barcelona never lose possession in that dangerous area in front of the back four because Busquets is such a talented passer. When Mascherano - an inferior passer, if perhaps a better tackler - was played in that role before Christmas, Barcelona looked a lot poorer. Xavi is a big fan of Busquets, saying:
"He is a soccer player who sees everything very fast. He has an excellent first touch and great balance."
A surprising element of the Champions League Final was the amount of space Busquets frequently had. Rooney was the obvious candidate to muzzle him with suitable aggression and technical proficiency, but instead concentrated on assuming wide positions to exploit space at fullback.
A lot is said of Messi but I feel that preventing the ball from reaching him (by way of Xavi and Iniesta) is key. Prevention not cure. Muzzling Busquets could be key. This will mean the centrebacks have to spend more time on the ball. Whilst they are accomplished for centrebacks they remain the weakest outfield players on the ball. Messi may well feel compelled to come even deeper to claim the ball, and the further away from your goal Messi is, the better.
As an aside, Mourinho's tactic in the Champions League Semi-Final first leg might well have worked, had they had a player like Tevez rather than Ronaldo playing. Ronaldo's unwillingness to press makes him a luxury player at times. A player like Tevez - who has now publicly stated his unwillingness to return to Manchester - might be the perfect solution for Mourinho.
In general hard working forwards are needed to contain Barcelona's fullbacks and press from the front. Inter's 3-1 victory at home to Barcelona last season is partly testament to this.
2 - Control the momentum of the match
Momentum is fantastically important in football. A team losing 3-2 will feel very differently if they surrendered a 2-0 lead than if they have pulled two goals back in quick succession.
Barcelona do a fantastic job of controlling momentum through keeping possession. Their abundance of sideways passes which accounts for a good proportion of their ridiculously high possession statistics are not valuable in terms of match-winning merit - although some football purists certainly see it that way - but in the asphyxiating effect they have on the game. Whilst they have the ball the momentum of the game is in their hands. The other team are playing in reaction to them. Psychologically this is extremely important.
Notably when things aren't going their way they are more than happy to play dirty. Diving, hounding the referee, winding up opponents... you name it, they will do it. Whatever it takes to unnerve the opposition.
Whilst you are unlikely to be able to outpass Barcelona, disrupting their rhythm - as Real Madrid sometimes managed this season - could be key to defeating them.
An extension of this is to be mentally resilient. When you don't have the ball it is important to remain disciplined, composed, concentrated and be willing to contest every ball. A game against Barcelona will be won in the head as much as on the field.
Make the most of set-pieces
Manchester United didn't have a single corner against Barcelona in the Champions League final. When their side is so short it seems to me to be a missed opportunity. Excellently taken free kicks and corners into the penalty area are surely a good way to beat Barcelona.
Switching Play
When Barcelona lose the ball they hound the opposition very quickly in an attempt to win it back. When Inter beat Barcelona 3-1 at the San Siro, they focused on playing a lot of switches from one side of the pitch to the other. If Barcelona press aggressively it means they have fewer players elsewhere. Players like Sneijder and Xabi Alonso, combined with some positive forward play could be enough to expose Barcelona, particularly when their fullbacks hold such high positions on the field.
So, to summarise...
Pressing, fighting, crossing and switching.
Whilst this is a far from comprehensive VOILA post, it could provide some keys to beating Barcelona. The key is in playing to win and remaining compact.
It is symptomatic of the failure to beat Barcelona that sides talk predominantly about how to stop Barcelona (Xavi, Messi et al) rather than on exposing their weaknesses. A reactive strategy is not enough to beat Barcelona. The best performances have involved a strong proactive element (e.g. Arsenal at Home, and Real Madrid in the Coppa del Rey). The successful side will take the initiative.
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